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Abstract 
 
China’s presence in Africa has increased phenomenally over the last six years. 
Chinese high-level visits have intensified, investment from China on the continent has 
soared, trade between the two regions has quintupled and perhaps most startling of all 
China has cancelled US$1.27 billion worth of debt to African countries. The extent at 
which China is engaged in Africa today would not have been possible had it not been 
for the relationship China nurtured from the very beginning between the two regions. 
China’s aid has been used to induce the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
African states and once diplomatic relations have been established, aid is used to 
ensure the establishment of strategically, lucrative economic agreements. This study 
will examine China’s aid policies in Africa from the 1950s through to the twenty-first 
century and aims to assess how foreign aid as a foreign policy tool has furthered 
China’s national interest in Africa.   
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Introduction 
 
Chinese Aid to Africa: A Foreign Policy Tool for Political Support 
 
China-Africa relations go back hundreds of years. However, China’s presence on the 
African continent only began soon after China ended its isolationist policies and came 
under the rule of the Communist Party in 1949. China soon realised that international 
interaction had become crucial for the survival of any state and a number of strategies 
would have to be followed in order to ensure its own survival. One such strategy was 
the implementation of aid policies to be used when pursuing its foreign policy 
objectives. 
 
China’s aid policies in Africa began in 1953, by 1976 China had aided more than 55 
countries around the world and 30 of those countries were from Africa. Thus it would 
appear that from the outset Africa received special attention from China. Often 
China’s aid would make its way to countries that were economically stronger than 
China.  However, if China was initially aiding countries with a stronger economy and 
better standard of living than its own, could this mean that China was doing so for 
reasons other than its self-proclaimed altruistic motivations of helping out a fellow-
developing state? Could one assume that China’s determined bilateral aid efforts in 
Africa, which have spanned six decades, were set up to perhaps serve its own self-
interest? This paper will set out to determine whether China’s aid has been successful 
in furthering China’s national interest amongst developing countries, especially in 
Africa. This is an important study because it will look at how China, as the biggest 
developing state in the world and its aid policies, will impact on Africa, the continent 
with the largest number of developing countries. The fact that China has long since 
been identified as an emerging global power will make this an important study, 
particularly as its influence in Africa is growing.  
 
The first chapter deals specifically with the theoretical framework in which this paper 
is set. The realist paradigm is used to understand the dynamics of foreign policy 
making and the evolution of China’s aid policies in Africa. The issues of national 
interest and aid as a foreign policy tool are also covered. In this section we come to 
understand that despite the globalisation of the world and the increased inter-
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dependence amongst states, China’s foreign policy outlook is still firmly rooted in the 
realist school of thought.   
 
The second chapter is devoted to the examination of China’s aid policies in Africa 
during the Cold War. During this time Chinese aid was understood as a foreign policy 
tool which transported socialist ideology around the world. During this period Africa 
was used as a proxy playground by China and Russia to fight for Third World 
influence. When the Soviet Union cut relations with China in the late 1960s, China 
began to place a greater significance on African nations. The aim of this section is to 
illustrate how Chinese aid was used to earn diplomatic recognition from African states. 
One of the best examples to illustrate this point is that of Peking gaining recognition 
over Taipei at the United Nations (UN) in 1971, which led to expanded Chinese 
influence in international affairs. 
 
The third chapter looks at Chinese aid in the post Cold War era. This period also 
coincides with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform policies. As a result the Chinese aid 
focus shifted and projects became increasingly engineered to ensure China would gain 
maximum economic returns.  In the mid-1990s Jiang Zemin identified Africa as a key 
market for Chinese products. This chapter will examine Zemin’s rule, where China 
for the first time identifies Africa with the primary objective to build, increase and 
diversify trade ties in order to facilitate China’s development. China’s renewed 
interest in Africa kick started with Zemin’s 1996 African Safari and eventually 
culminated in the October 2000 Beijing Forum. 
 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the examination of China’s presence in Africa since 
2000. In the last seven years China’s engagement in Africa has become almost 
exclusively commercially-based and this chapter will illustrate how China’s 
commercial success on the continent has been significantly helped along by various 
aid packages China offers along with its trade and investment deals. In order to satisfy 
its booming economy China needed to look for diversified sources of raw materials. 
This chapter will examine the significance of the 2000, 2003 and 2006 China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum’s in strengthening and consolidating relations between the two 
regions. With increased Chinese engagement on the continent certain obstacles and 
challenges have risen which could jeopardise the good relations. These obstacles and 
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challenges will also be examined. Could it be that China is shifting from aid to trade 
in Africa in order to pursue its political objectives?    
 
The fifth chapter will examine the issue of Taiwan, both as a threat to China’s 
national security and also as a possible threat to China’s interests in Africa. In the 
early 1990s the Taiwan Issue becomes a prominent Chinese focus. Aid was 
terminated to those developing countries which either established or resumed 
diplomatic relations with Taipei. This chapter will examine if Chinese aid in Africa is 
used to win political support over Taiwan or rather to secure preferential trade 
agreements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14
Chapter 1 
 
 A Theoretical Framework 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
This paper aims to discuss how aid has been used as a successful foreign policy tool 
in furthering Chinese national interest amongst developing countries, especially in 
Africa. In order to understand the dynamics of foreign policy making, in general, and 
the evolution of Chinese aid to Africa, in particular, a variety of different foreign 
policy instruments within an overarching framework will need to be looked at. 
Therefore, this chapter will begin by looking at the realist paradigm – the oldest and 
most popular context in which international relations is studied and foreign policy is 
analysed. This will be followed by a discussion which looks at the relationship 
between national interest and foreign policy. Lastly, aid will be examined as a foreign 
policy tool. 
 
1.2. The Realist Paradigm of International Relations 
 
Despite claims from states to further moral causes, such as human rights, within a 
state the realist paradigm of international relations continues to form the rationale 
behind state’s foreign policy decisions. Thus, the realist school of thought subscribes 
to three primary principles about the world: 1) statism; 2) survival; and 3) self-help.3 
Let’s consider each principle in a little more detail.   
 
1.2.1. Statism 
 
The most important assumption realists make is that states are the dominant actors in 
international relations. The actions and interactions of states are constrained and 
directed by the operation of structural elements in the inter-state system. “The state as 
an actor is conceived of as an autonomous political entity ultimately responsible and 
                                                 
3 Dunne, T., and Schmidt, B.C., “Realism”, The Globalization of World Politics: In introduction to 
international relations  (second edition), Baylis, J and Smith, S., (eds), Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2001, p. 143 
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accountable only to itself. The domestic dimension of the state being considered as 
largely irrelevant, its actions conceived as emanating, not from its own polity, but 
from the actions of other states.”4 Thus according to state-centrism, states must be 
regarded as cohesive, autonomous actors which have territorial boundaries. There is 
an assumption that the presence of a domestic sovereign authority implies that 
individuals need not worry about their own security, as it is provided for them in the 
form of a system of law, police protection, and prisons. However, in the relations 
amongst independent sovereign states, insecurities, dangers and threats to the state 
appear large. Realists claim that the reason for this is that there is no higher, 
overarching, sovereign authority in the international arena which can make states 
obey rules they do not want to obey, in other words, we live in an anarchic system.5 
China views the growing transnational and multilateral networks through a state-
centric prism, which only focuses on how China can take advantage of the new 
external environments to protect and maximize its national interest.6 This would also 
help to explain the vast number of Chinese state-owned businesses operating in Africa, 
which are used in conjunction with the Chinese government to carry out its aid 
commitments. Since the 1990s, China has renewed its emphasis on “the five 
principles of peaceful coexistence”7 and frequently emphasised that these principles 
should become the guidelines for the new international political order. Deng argues 
that these principles boil down to a “respect for sovereignty, whose core is a notion of 
political authority as lying exclusively in the hands of spatially differentiated states, 
they constitute the basis for an anarchy of mutual recognition, and therefore tend to 
promote egoistic over collective conceptions of interest.” 8  These principles are 
intended to counter the hegemony and power politics, particularly of Western states, 
ironically though they defend the Westphalian anarchic nature of international 
relations.9     
 
                                                 
4 Reynolds, C., The World of States: An introduction to explanation and theory, Edward Elgar 
Publishng Company: England, 1992, p.55 
5 Dunne, T., and Schmidt, B.C., Op cit, p.150 
6 Deng, Y., “The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations”, The China 
Quarterly, 1998, p.311 
7 These principles are looked at in greater detail in the following chapter. 
8 Deng, Y., Op cit, p.311 
9 Loc it 
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It would therefore appear that states first organise power domestically and only then 
accumulate power internationally. Realists therefore view relations between states as 
a struggle for power. Most leaders believe that power will grant them the capacity to 
advance and safeguard their country’s national interest.10 Power for realists comes in 
two forms: firstly, power is not exercised in a vacuum, but rather in relation to another 
entity, and second, calculations need to be made not only about ones own power 
capabilities, but also about the power that other state actors possess.11  Traditionally, 
this power was translated to military strength, however the more liberal wing of 
realism noted the importance of power as prestige, that is, the ability to get what you 
want without the threat or use of force but rather through diplomatic influence.12 
Since the inception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China has been 
especially successful in exercising its diplomatic influence in Africa. 
  
1.2.2. Survival 
 
The second element which unites realists is that in international relations, the primary 
goal of the state is survival, which is held as a precondition for attaining all other 
goals.13 John Mearsheimer argues that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a 
hegemonic position in the international system.14 If we are to take into consideration 
China’s one hundred years of humiliation at the hands of Western powers and Japan 
and look at Chinese foreign policy rhetoric over the years it would appear that China 
too, hopes to become a superpower.  
 
1.2.3. Self-help 
 
If the primary goal of the state is survival then the central activity of the state is the 
pursuit and exercise of power in order to preserve itself and its political identity. The 
self-help assumption argues that no other state can be relied on to guarantee your own 
survival. Waltz argued that the key difference between international and domestic 
politics is in its structure. Domestically, citizens do not have to defend themselves 
                                                 
10 Mingst, K., Essentials for International Relations, WW Norton: New York, 1999, p.131 
11 Dunne, T., and Schmidt, B.C., Op cit, p.151 
12 Loc it 
13 Loc it 
14 Ibid, p.152 
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whereas the international system is archaic, therefore security can only be realised 
through self-help15 . This pursuit of security leads to insecurity. The more a state 
builds up its power in order to improve its security, the less secure and more 
threatened its neighbours feel. They in turn start to build up their own power supply, 
such as enlarging their own military or forming alliances. One could argue that 
China’s strategy of building alliances in the developing world has been a reaction to 
the insecurity created by the United States (US) hegemony. Furthermore, while the 
traditional Western realists considered military security as high politics and economic 
and social issues as low politics, Chinese realists place greater emphasis on economic 
and technological development. This is due to China’s conviction that international 
politics is characterised by the competition for “comprehensive power” in a wide 
variety of fields, including military, political, economic and technological.16   The 
previously mentioned situation is known as the power-security hypothesis and asserts 
that whatever aims the state pursues, including the welfare of its people, the primary 
interest is that of preserving its own interests.17 Morgenthau believes that interest is 
defined in terms of power, which reveals the true behaviour of politicians and guards 
against the misconceptions of what determines a states foreign policy, which are the 
motives of statesmen and ideological preferences. While politicians cast their policies 
in ideological terms, they are restricted by what is desirable versus what is actually 
possible. Thus, the “national interest” which should be the sole pursuit of statesmen is 
always defined in terms of strategic and economic capabilities.18  The concept of 
national interest will be discussed in the following section.  
 
1.3. National Interest 
 
National interest is a determinate that guides state policy in relation to the external 
environment. Basically, at the root of the idea of national interest is the realist 
principle of state security and survival. 19  Joseph Frankel argued that without 
clarification the different contexts in which national interest was used could lead to 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p.153 
16 Deng, Y., Op cit, p.315 
17 Reynolds, S., Op cit, p.57  
18 Burchill, S., “Realism and Neo-Realism”, in Theories of International Relations, Burchill, S., and 
Linklater, A., (eds.), Snt Martins Press: Boston, 1996, p.75 
19 Evans, G., and Newnam, J., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books: 
England, 1998, p.345 
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ambiguity. National interest can thus describe the aspirations of the state, or it can 
describe the application in the actual policies and programmes pursued.20 The realist, 
Hans Morgenthau believed that national interest was central to understanding the 
process of international politics. He said that “the kind of interest determining 
political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural 
context within which foreign policy is formulated”.21  Morgenthau also believed that 
national interest could be ascertained and advanced by the possession of power. 
However, this has been criticised for a number of reasons, primarily though, in the 
long run, a system based only on the self-centred pursuit of goals by its individual 
members can give no assurance of stability, safety, justice, equity or peace.22 None-
the-less, despite the occasional ambiguous definition of national interest Chinese 
foreign-policy makers believe that in international politics, relations in national 
interests are the fundamental factor influencing foreign policy behaviour, and national 
interests are the most long-lasting, the most influential factor and the most basic 
motive of the states foreign behaviour. 23  Deng Xiaoping said that “national 
sovereignty and national security should be the top priority. National rights are more 
important than human rights and the latter should by no means be allowed to 
undermine the former.”24This view has continued to underlie China’s foreign policy 
to this day.  
 
1.4. Foreign Policy 
 
Foreign policy provides the most vivid examples of acts of state and of the character 
of the state as an international actor with rights, agency, responsibility and 
accountability, as well as power.25 Morgan and Palmer say that states struggle to have 
their objectives realised at many different levels, and at any moment, any state will be 
relatively pleased with the status quo on some issues, and relatively displeased with 
                                                 
20 Frankel, J., International Relations in a Changing World, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1964, 
p.85 
21 Rosenau, J. N., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Revised and Enlarged Edition, Francis Pinter 
Publishers Ltd: London, 1979, p.285 
22 Sonderman, F., “The Theory of National Interest”, The Theroy and Practice of International 
Relations (eighth edition), Olson, W.C., (ed) Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1991, p.38 
23 Deng,Y., Op cit, p.313 
24 Ibid, p.313 cited in Deng, X., The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol.III, Renmin Chubanshe, 
Beijing, 1993, p.347-348 
25 Scruton, R., Dictionary of Political Thought, Macmillan Press: London, 1986, p.174 
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the status quo on others. States have limited resources with which to pursue their 
foreign policy goals, therefore the fundamental decision facing states involves 
allocating their resources between things to change unfavourable aspects of the status 
quo and efforts to maintain those favourable elements of the status quo.26 Similarly, 
as Vale and Mphaisha say foreign policy can thus be defined as “the sum total of all 
activities by which international actors act, react and interact with their environment 
beyond their national borders.”27 Foreign policy makers often perceive foreign policy 
as “actions chosen by the national government that maximise its strategic goals and 
objectives”. 28  In other words national interest determines how foreign policy 
decisions are made and carried out.  
 
Realism emphasises that the international environment determines state action; in turn 
foreign policy making consists mainly of adjusting the nation-state to pressures of an 
anarchical world system. As a result all states and the individuals responsible for its 
foreign policy confront the problem of national survival in the same way. As a result 
because the goals and corresponding decision calculus of the states are the same, the 
foreign policy decision-making processes of each can be studied as though it were a 
unitary actor.29 The different units which make up the decision-making apparatus will 
be looked at and policy is then explained by the way the units relate to each other. 
 
1.5. Foreign Policy Tools 
 
Lastly, foreign policy tools are instruments that policy makers have at their disposal to 
implement foreign policy for the wider benefit of the state. These tools could be 
carried out in a friendly, persuasive (this would include opening, increasing, 
expanding or supporting the foreign policy tools) coercive or even hostile (foreign 
policy carried out in this manner is usually restrictive, reductive or opposing) manner. 
These tools include diplomatic recognition, scientific co-operation, sanctions, military 
                                                 
26 Morgan, T.C., and Palmer, G., “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Insights from 
the ‘Two-Good’ Theory” in Issues and Studies, vol.35, no.3, May/June 1999, p.39 
27 Vale, P., and Mphaisha, C. J. J., “Analysing and Evaluating Foreign Policy” in Power, Wealth and 
Global Order: An International Relations Textbook to Africa, P. Nel and P. McGowan (eds), UCT 
Press: Cape town, 1999, p. 89  
28 Mingst, K., Op cit, p. 131 
29 Kegley, C.W., and Wittkopf, E.R., World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Eighth ed), 
Bedford/St. Martins Press, Boston, 2001, p. 46-47 
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co-operation, economic co-operation, technical assistance, aid, trade and investment. 
Policy makers are continuously trying to determine whether and how to use these 
specific tools. Aid is a popular and effective foreign policy tool and as this thesis is 
dealing specifically with Chinese aid to Africa, this particular tool will be focussed 
on.   
 
1.5.1. Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool 
 
Foreign aid in its simplest form is an instrument of policy used in order to achieve 
certain goals. 30 The long-range and general purpose of aid is to assist developing 
countries to mobilise their economies for sustained economic growth, help alleviate 
poverty, malnutrition, and lack of social opportunities, and as a strategic payoff, bring 
about political stability. Overall, donors use aid primarily to demonstrate sympathies 
to recipients’ domestic or foreign policies, to symbolise alliance relationships, support 
friendly regimes facing a difficult time, either economically or from political 
oppositions. By-products of aid relationships include political influence and possible 
leverage, developing future commercial opportunities with the recipient, and for 
some, the satisfaction of seeing aid projects having immediate social and economic 
improvements at the grassroots level.31 Using the foreign aid framework is a useful 
analytical tool in improving the understanding of a country’s foreign policy 
behaviour. Foreign aid can be identified as an output of a foreign policy and the 
performance of foreign policy goals. The quantification of foreign aid data, therefore, 
becomes an important indicator of a donor’s foreign policy goals and international 
behaviour. As Teh-Chang Lin says, observers can analyse a decision-maker’s foreign 
policy behaviour and improve their own interpretation of the decision-maker’s 
perception of a political world which results in somewhat reducing the gap of 
perception between an observer and a decision-maker.32 
 
Morgenthau said that “the transfer of money and services from one government to 
another performs the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be 
                                                 
30 Evans, G., and Newnam, J., Op cit, p.177 
31 Holsti, K. J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Prentice all Inc.: London, 1995, p.184 
32 Lin, T.C., “Beijing’s Foreign Aid Policy in the 1990s: Continuity and Change”, Issues and Studies, 
January 1996, p.43 
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rendered”.33 Similarly, David Dollar of the World Bank and Alberto Alesina point out 
in a study on foreign aid, “the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political 
and strategic considerations as by the economic needs and policy performance of the 
recipients”. 34  Foreign aid is therefore justified for economic development. 
Morgenthau points out that foreign aid for economic development, in particular, is 
more powerful as a political tool because of the immediate and obvious benefits it has 
for the recipient country, than aid which promises obscure benefits that lie far in the 
future. “The political effects of foreign aid are lost if its foreign source is not obvious 
to the recipients. For it is not aid as such or its beneficial results that creates political 
loyalties on the part of the recipient, but the positive relationship that the mind of the 
recipients establishes between the aid and its beneficial results, on the one hand, and 
the political philosophy, the political system, and the political objectives of the giver, 
on the other.”35  In the case of China and Africa, through its aid policies China was 
very successful in eliciting diplomatic support from African states, particularly 
concerning issues brought forward at the United Nations (UN).   
 
Thus, a donor’s selection of aid recipients is influenced by its quest of foreign policy 
goals within a certain period of time. Different foreign policy goals result in the donor 
selecting different aid recipients. The selection of these aid recipients thus becomes a 
useful gauge of the donor country’s foreign policy. As a result, the basic, long-term 
goal of foreign aid is political.36  Morgenthau points out that because of the very 
political nature of foreign aid, “its effect upon the prestige of the giving nation must 
always be in the minds of the formulators and executors of foreign aid policies.”37 
Bilateral channels are integral to China’s foreign policy when carrying out its aid 
programmes. The reason for this is not only for the differing political, economic, 
social and geographic conditions that exist in each country, but also for the fact that 
because of those very differences, China is able to wrangle deals very complimentary 
to its own foreign policy objectives. Huntington says that bilateral programs are used 
                                                 
33 Morgenthau, H., “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid” American Political Science Review, vol.56, 
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34 Francis, D.R. “For rich, foreign aid is a tool of persuasion”, 
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35 Ibid, p.308-309 
36 Lin, T.C., Op cit, p.44 
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when a country has special political, economic or security interests.38 Therefore this 
paper will look at China’s selection of African states as aid recipients and China’s 
foreign policy goals at the time of giving aid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Huntington, S.P., “Foreign Aid For What and For Whom” in Foreign Policy, no.1, Winter 1970-71, 
p. 189  
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Chapter 2 
 
Chinese Aid during the Cold War: A Brief Overview (1955-1990) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Chinese aid has existed for centuries, although not called aid or assistance as such; 
China’s aid was usually carried out in the form of the tribute system. The tribute 
philosophy is a practice that goes back many centuries and has been deeply embedded 
in Chinese procedures when carrying out foreign relations. In 1949, when China came 
under the rule of the Communist government, its centuries of isolation came to an 
abrupt end, as interaction with the international community became increasingly 
important for the survival of any state. However, inward looking policies continued to 
dominate the Communist’s style of rule and despite its economic strife, China 
managed to continue with the legacy of the so-called tribute system that was used to 
acknowledge the superiority of the Chinese Empire. This manifested itself through 
China’s foreign policy and more specifically through its aid policies, thus giving 
China the international legitimacy it so desperately needed.  
 
During the Cold War China’s interest in Africa was carried out through its foreign 
policy and sought three primary goals. Firstly, Africa served as a battlefield against 
US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. Secondly, China sought the 
recognition and support of African states, both as a member of the international 
community and as members of the Third world. Lastly, according to Chinese 
perceptions, Africa held a place in the world’s unfolding revolutionary struggle 
against capitalism, imperialism and social imperialism. The African liberation 
movements served the function of establishing and maintaining China’s revolutionary 
credibility.39  
 
This chapter will discuss how China’s aid policies during the Cold War benefited 
China politically, and will be illustrated by a number of approaches. The first 
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approach will look at the initiation and development of China’s aid policies to Africa.  
The 1955 Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai’s African tour and the Cultural 
Revolution all had a significant impact on the development and disbursement of 
Chinese aid over this period. It is also important to look at the tribute system as the 
core practices of this system have manifested itself through China’s aid policies today. 
The second approach will look at the international context that prompted China to 
engage in Africa, the most noticeable interaction at the time was the Sino-Soviet 
struggle. The third approach will illustrate some of the biggest examples of where 
Chinese aid policies have led to the substantial benefit of Chinese national self-
interest. These examples include the Tan-Zam railway and the events leading up to 
the change of recognition from Taiwan at the United Nations Security Council in 
1971. The final approach will discuss how aid policies changed under China’s second 
president, Deng Xiaoping.  
 
2.2. The Tribute System 
 
China’s foreign policy developed over many centuries of relative isolation, almost 
three thousand years ago40. The Chinese Empire established a so-called tribute system 
in managing its relationship with countries that did not belong to the empire, but 
surrounded it as its closest neighbours. The people surrounding the Chinese Empire 
were supposed to show respect for the Chinese Emperor by sending tributes to him in 
regular intervals and obeying certain conventions. Thus the rulers of these 
neighbouring countries could preserve their own authority and rule their countries in 
sovereignty, but at the same time acknowledge the superiority of the Chinese 
civilisation. It was a system heavily influenced by Confucianism and ruled by a set of 
rites that underlined the symbolic power of the Chinese emperor.41 China had little 
contact with other civilised people, contacts were usually with nomadic tribes and less 
                                                 
40 It is generally acknowledged that many of China’s interactions with the outside world came via the 
Silk Road (An ancient trade route between China and the Mediterranean Sea extending some 6440 km 
and linking China with the Roman Empire). This included contact during the first and second century 
AD, contacts with representatives of the Roman Empire, and during the thirteenth century, contact with 
Marco Polo.  (Wikipedia, “Foreign Relations of Imperial China”, February 2004 
http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=Foreign+relations+of+imperial
+China&gwp=8&curtab=2222_1,  p.1)This interaction with the outside world would mean that some 
sort of set of rules, procedures or foreign policy would have to have been set up to enable China to 
interact with these states.   
41 (No author)., “China and the Outer World- The Chinese Tribute System”, February 2004 
http://www.lcsc.edu/modernchina/u3s2p2.htm, p.1 
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developed cultures. This resulted in a strong sense of superiority from the Chinese 
toward other nationalities.42 The Chinese attained a hierarchical view of the world 
with China at the top. The Chinese people considered it their responsibility to spread 
their civilisation to the culturally deprived, thus advocating a patronising attitude 
toward other people and cultures. Throughout the centuries foreign messengers visited 
China to learn from the Chinese or bargain for protection or trade. In respect for 
Chinese custom they always brought gifts or payment with them. The tribute system 
was thus an outgrowth of China’s view of the world and its economic and political 
relations with the non-Chinese and thus became the basis for China’s foreign 
relations.43 The tribute system was an integral part of China’s historical diplomacy 
and can be seen to relate to its foreign aid diplomacy. For example, important 
diplomatic business is carried out during aid missions or when grants or loans are 
made. Tribute missions represented exchanges of loyalty and friendship enhancing the 
prestige of ruling groups on both sides. Tribute missions were more beneficial to the 
tribute bearer than to China. Copper indicates that China’s foreign aid provided an 
avenue for the export of Chinese products or credits to purchase Chinese goods, rather 
than in foreign currency. Tribute missions that went to China in the past were often 
presented with Chinese products which represented the advanced nature of the 
Chinese culture. Similarly, during the Cold War when China started its aid projects, 
the projects demonstrated China’s technologically advanced skills. Copper believes 
that Chinese aid was motivated more by political than economic concerns, just as the 
tribute missions of the past gave priority to political over economic goals.44  It is 
important to look at China’s tribute system as it provides us with a background to the 
                                                 
42 Chinese theories of foreign relations first developed during the Zhou dynasty almost three thousand 
years ago and were further elaborated under the Han dynasty one thousand years later. Their foreign 
policy was based on Confucian ideology, with its emphasis on a hierarchical and non-egalitarian 
society. The emperor, far from being the ruler of one state among many, was considered to be the 
mediator between heaven and earth. He was the apex of the human hierarchy, the "Son of Heaven," and 
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and the cosmic order remain stable and harmonious. Therefore, China's neighbours were expected to 
recognize Chinese superiority by presenting tribute to the emperor. The emperor, for his part, lent the 
weight of his authority to the political position and powers of his tributaries, and reinforced them with 
economic and military assistance if needed. (Yihong, P., “Traditional Chinese Theories of Foreign 
Relations and Tang Foreign Policy”, Asian Review II., 1998,  
http://nacrp.cic.sfu.ca/nacrp/articles/panyihong/panyihongtext.html, p.1 ) 
43 Copper, J. F., China’s Foreign Aid: An Instrument of Peking’s Foreign Policy, Lexington Books: 
Toronto, 1976, p.4 
44 Ibid, p.6 
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way in which China dealt with its foreign relations both at the creation of the PRC, as 
well as well into the twenty first century. 
 
Chinese contact with Africa dates as far back as the fourteenth century when a famous 
Chinese explorer made several voyages down Africa’s eastern coast, as far south as 
Zanzibar. On every expedition Cheng Ho received valuable tributes or gifts from the 
local inhabitants for Emperor Yung-Lo. Tributes included gold, ivory, tortoise shell 
and animals and were meant to indicate acknowledgement of the emperor’s distant 
authority. Occasionally Cheng Ho would bring back “Devil Slaves” to serve in the 
Imperial Chinese Court.45 However after Cheng’s seventh voyage China began to 
adopt an inward looking policy and the new emperor denounced expansionism and 
put an end to all voyages. Documentation relating to the voyages were burnt and for 
many centuries China’s interest in the land beyond its borders did not exist. The last 
medieval contact between China and Africa was in 1411 when the ruler of Egypt sent 
emissaries to the Chinese court complete with various gifts and products. Interestingly, 
the next recorded official contact between the two regions came some 540 years later 
when the premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chou En-lai, shook the 
hand of Egyptian President Gamul Nasser, at the Bandung Conference of African-
Asian nations.46 Thus the modern links between China and Africa were initiated. 
 
2.3. The Bandung Conference 
 
The Bandung Conference of African-Asian states took place in April 1955 between 
29 African47 and Asian states in Indonesia. It is interesting to note that at the time of 
the Bandung Conference, as a new regime with ideological commitments that did not 
conform to the ideals of the Western world, China was a country alienated by the 
West, which gave China its own reasons for its anti-colonial stance. Also most 
African and Asian states had not yet gained their independence from their colonial 
rulers. At this stage there was a great resistance to colonial influence and anti-
imperialist sentiment was rife among the Third World countries. In terms of China’s 
                                                 
45 Greig, I., The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and 
Cuban Policies, South African Freedom Foundation: Sandton, 1977, p. 68 
46 Hutchinson, A., China’s African Revolution, Hutchinson and Co.: London, 1975, p.11 
47 Only six African states attended the conference, they were: Egypt, Ethiopia, Golden Coast (Ghana), 
Liberia, Libya and Sudan. Golden Coast, Libya and Sudan were still under colonial rule. 
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objectives this was the perfect time to gain support from the Third World countries, as 
most if not all countries were fed up with colonial rule.  
 
The meeting of Premier Chou and President Nasser marked the first official contact 
between China and Africa in over 500 years. At the conference Premier Chou 
succeeded in creating an impression that there existed a united front of Communists 
and non-Communists, based on a common conviction that Western colonialism and 
Western military pacts were the only real dangers threatening the independence of the 
new Asian and African states. As a result militant anti-imperialism was encouraged.48 
Chou stressed the fact that Asian and African countries needed to co-operate in the 
fields of economics and culture in order to facilitate common efforts to end the 
economic and cultural backwardness that had resulted from long time plunder and 
oppression from colonialism. In Premier Chou’s speech, he proposed the “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which he had signed in an earlier bilateral 
agreement with India’s Nehru in 1954, and made additions that would appeal to all 
African and Asian countries. At Bandung the Five Principles became Seven Principles: 
 
1) Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations;  
2)  Abstain from the use of aggression and threats;  
3)  Non-interference in the internal affairs of nations;  
4)  Racial equality and non-discrimination;  
5)  Equality of all nations;  
6)  Respect for the freedom to choose and economic and political system; and  
7)  Mutually beneficial relations between nations.49  
These principles were to serve as the foundation for the Sino-Africa relationship into 
the next century.  
 
The Bandung Conference was followed by Chinese efforts to increase diplomatic, 
economic and cultural contacts in Africa. Just over a year later in May 1956, the first 
Chinese embassy in Africa was established in Cairo, with the wider function of 
contacting as many African groups as possible and making a concrete analysis of the 
                                                 
48  Lowenthal, R., “China” in Africa and the Communist World, Brzezinski, Z., (ed), Stanford 
University Press: California, 1965, p.151 
49 Cooley, J. K., East Wind Over Africa: Red China’s African Offensive, Walker: New York, 1965, 
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situation in Africa in general.50 During 1956 and 1957, Chinese delegations visited 
Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Ghana. The Chinese got their first bridgehead 
advance for political activity in Africa when the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Conference met in Cairo in December 1957 and established a permanent international 
secretariat there. The Bandung conference had taken the Chinese several steps out of 
isolation, and the proliferation of new African states provided China with plenty of 
new opportunities to gain international acceptance and diplomatic recognition.   
 
2.4. Chou En-Lai’s African Tour 
 
The importance of Africa in Chinese foreign policy manifested itself during Chou En-
lai’s African Tour. From December 1963 until February 1964 Chou En-lai and 
approximately forty Chinese officials toured ten African countries (Algeria, Ghana, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and Somalia), with the 
official purpose of enhancing the mutual understanding between China and these 
countries. During his trip Chou pointed out that one of the major aims of China’s 
foreign policy was to “actively support the national liberation movements in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.”51 He also stressed that China was itself a country that had 
been liberated from imperialism and colonialism, thus it was her “duty to support” 
those countries in a similar situation.52 There are four less important but connected 
reasons for his tour. Firstly, his tour symbolised China’s efforts to break out of US 
containment and to show that China had global interests. Secondly, the tour was 
undertaken to boost China’s image that had been tarnished by her support for 
subversive activities in many African countries. Thirdly, to explain to her friends that 
China’s decreasing aid efforts were caused by the temporary Chinese economic crisis 
- that had begun as a result of the policies implemented by Mao’s “Great Leap 
Forward”53 - but would be expanded once the circumstances permitted her to do so.54 
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Finally, Chou was gathering African support for a second Bandung conference, which 
China wanted to initiate before the holding of a proposed second non-aligned 
summit. 55  Specifically, China wanted to exclude the Soviet Union from the 
conference on the basis that it was neither an African nor an Asian country, and it was 
also searching for support for Mao’s revolutionary aims.  
 
On his tour Chou stressed the similarities between Africa and China, and played down 
the differences, however the tour did highlight many of the problems facing China in 
Africa. At this time relations between the Soviet Union and China were far from 
friendly. China had developed a policy which was based on the thesis that there could 
be no thought of co-existence between communists and non-communist countries 
until all the people’s “oppressed” by “imperialism” had secured their freedom and 
“imperialism” itself had been destroyed.56  The Soviet Union’s policy of peaceful 
coexistence with the non-communist and imperial US clearly ran against this policy. 
In Egypt Chou was shown the great Soviet-built Aswan Dam (as the biggest aid 
project in Africa at the time, this project greatly influenced China’s decision to 
sponsor the Tan-Zam railway when negotiations started between Tanzania, Zambia 
and China a year later). In Algeria he found that African’s resented Chinese 
pretensions to lead the revolutionary struggles, China’s help was welcome but 
Africa’s revolutions would be won and led by Africans. In West Africa, especially 
Ghana, his attention was drawn to signs of considerable Soviet influence, and thus 
had to compare large-scale Soviet aid schemes with China’s more modest 
programmes.57  Chou En-lai’s Africa tour was a significant point in Chinese foreign 
policy; it was the first time such a large Chinese delegation had visited Africa. Chou 
En-lai’s Africa tour was also the first time where China explicitly set out its principles 
for foreign aid.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
industry, over-production of poor quality goods, deterioration of industrial plants through 
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In Somalia, the last country of his African tour, Chou set out the eight principles 
which China would follow when providing economic and technical assistance, they 
emphasised self reliance and the development of an independent national economy. 
The principles are as follows:  
 
 First, the Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality 
and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. 
 Second, in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly 
respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries as far as possible. 
 Third, the Chinese government provides economic aid in the form of interest-
free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment so as to lighten the 
burden of the recipient countries as far as possible. 
 Fourth, in providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese 
Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help 
them embark on the road of self-reliance step by step. 
 Fifth, the Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries 
build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the 
recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital. 
 Sixth, the Chinese Government provides the best quality equipment and 
material of its own manufacture at international market prices. 
 Seventh, in giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese 
Government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such 
techniques. 
 Eighth, the experts dispatched by the Chinese Government to help in 
construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the 
experts in the recipient country.58  
 
Chou’s Africa Trip was the first time that China was able to speak not only to leaders 
(as it had done several years before with a handful of African representatives which 
had not yet gained their independence, in Bandung), but also to large groups of 
ordinary African people and the rest of the world through the mass media.59 At a 
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farewell dinner in Mogadishu 、 Somalia,  Chou told his audience that the 
revolutionary prospects were excellent throughout the African continent. Chou and 
his delegation left Africa satisfied with the Chinese Communist influence in Africa.60   
 
2.5. The Cultural Revolution 
 
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1969) was a ‘rectification 
campaign’ directed against the more conservative members in the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and sought to re-establish the dominance of Maoist ideology 
over economics.61 At this time China’s interest in Africa, and with the outside world 
in general, was contracted. During the period of the Cultural Revolution most senior 
officials and policy-makers were preoccupied with internal developments, and their 
own survival. Relationships with foreign countries were important only as long as 
those relations bore on developments within China. Peking remained friendly only 
with a few governments, it withdrew its ambassadors - except from Egypt, the first 
country where it had established an embassy - it drastically reduced its foreign aid, 
and renewed its support for armed struggle by Maoist insurgent forces against their 
local governments. The third world was still seen as the force that would cause the 
collapse of the west.62  
 
Aid agreements formed during the Cultural Revolution period illustrated a 
polarisation of relationships. The vast majority of aid went to radical countries 
friendly with China. There were not enough resources or political will to help 
countries whose relationship with China was half-hearted. Aid was used to reward old 
friends, not to win new ones. Aid was withheld, or at best implemented slowly, in 
countries which openly criticised the Cultural Revolution or which too publicly 
condemned or banned importation of revolutionary propaganda. For example, Egypt 
adopted a very lukewarm stance toward the Cultural Revolution and as a result did not 
receive industrial machinery China had said it would supply between 1965 and 1968, 
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neither was it able to draw on a Chinese loan pledged in 1964.63 In return for aid 
received from China, China’s most insistent demand from her African friends was 
public support for the aims of the Cultural Revolution and verbal praise to the 
brilliance and superiority of Moa Tse-tung’s thought.64 
 
2.6. The Sino-Soviet Struggle 
 
During the Cold War China’s basic foreign policy goals were to ensure the state of 
security in China and to ensure the continued authority of the Communist Party within 
the state. Specifically though, China’s foreign policy objectives were to establish and 
maintain secure borders; to diversify and expand its foreign trade and state economy; 
to gain international recognition and influence; to achieve a position of leadership 
among the developing world countries; to win the responsibility of ideological guide 
in the Communist world; and to undermine Western influence in the international 
system.65 In light of its foreign policy, Africa’s newly independent states provided 
wonderful opportunities for China to attain these goals. However, as mentioned 
earlier, one of China’s primary goals in Africa was to use the continent as a battlefield 
against Soviet social (and Western) imperialism. At this point I will briefly discuss 
Sino-Soviet relations and how these relations influenced Chinese foreign policy, more 
specifically Chinese aid policies, in Africa.  
 
In 1950 China first extended economic aid to North Korea, on an unofficial basis, 
merely as an extension of Soviet aid. China and the Soviet Union had just signed a 
treaty of mutual assistance, in which China envisioned large amounts of assistance 
from the Soviets.66 When the Korean War broke out in 1950, a “fellow-Communist 
state” was threatened and both China and the Soviet Union went to its aid. China went 
to its assistance, while at the same time receiving aid from the Soviet Union. However 
at this time, China was expecting better terms and more assistance than it was getting, 
but could not argue as it was not in a very good bargaining position due to its 
alienation from the West. Thus, as mentioned earlier, at this stage China’s aid was 
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merely an extension of Soviet aid. China’s purpose was to cement economic ties 
between members of the Communist bloc and provide China with allies against the 
West.67  
 
After Stalin died, Mao began to express disappointment in the Soviet Union’s aid to 
China. He became apprehensive of Soviet efforts to gain a hold over China’s 
economy and to interfere in China’s internal problems. Mao began to take actions to 
preserve China’s independence, and started to give aid to non-communist countries, 
thus showing that China was also a leader of the Communist world and not just 
another Soviet-satellite. The Soviet Union reacted by giving aid to some of the same 
countries that China had aided, suggesting that it did not approve of China’s attempts 
to win an independent sphere of influence. Thus tensions between the two countries 
started to develop. Tensions escalated in 1960 when China openly expressed its 
disapproval for the leadership of the Soviet Union and the policies it set forth in the 
communist world, in retaliation Moscow immediately cut all aid to China. 68  
Furthermore, China’s policies were based on the presumption that there could be no 
thought of co-existence between Communist and non-Communist countries until all 
the people ‘oppressed’ by imperialism had secured their freedom and imperialism 
itself had been destroyed. 69  It was at this time that China’s aid shifted to non-
communist Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and often favoured the more 
revolutionary nations. China’s aid was used to support wars of national liberation, this 
was done to create an alternative, revolutionary kind of communism and to gain 
international recognition for Mao’s regime, which China believed both the US the 
Soviet Union were trying to deny it.  
 
In 1964-1965 aid competition between China and the Soviet Union escalated, the 
focus was primarily on Asian and African countries. Both countries provided loans 
and gifts to the African and Asian countries in order to try gain support for the second 
Afro-Asian conference which was scheduled to open in Algeria in 1965 – although in 
the end the conference never took place.  However during this time China’s range and 
depth in its aid programme increased, specifically China gave economic assistance to 
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many countries it had never given aid to before. In total China spent more than 
US$ 500 million to win over support for its views and get promises of support for the 
proposed Afro-Asian conference. 70  The Soviets had spent more than twice that 
amount. China’s efforts in persuading Africa and convincing itself of the Soviet 
Union’s imperialist tendencies began to pay off in the late 1960s. Two major incidents 
which happened within in a year of each other, confirmed to many African leaders 
that their fears of the Soviet Union as just another imperialist power, no better than its 
former colonialists, was in fact true. In 1968, when the Soviet Union invaded 
Czechoslovakia, it released the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified Soviet intervention 
in socialist countries judged to have “bad tendencies”.71 The armed conflict along the 
Sino-Soviet border the following year in 1969 confirmed China’s convictions. These 
two acts confirmed to the rest of the world that perhaps China had a legitimate cause 
for worry.  
 
The 1969 border clashes heightened China’s fears that the Soviets would take major 
military action against China. China’s very survival was at stake and in an attempt to 
counterbalance the Soviet threat; China began to look for allies to deter the Soviet 
Union. The best choice was obviously the US it was the only country that would be 
able to stand up to the Soviet Union militarily. Thus it tried establishing political 
relations with the US.72 Based on the common interest of deterring the Soviet Union 
and its hegemonic tendencies, China and the US normalised relations in 1972.   
 
2.7. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway 
 
After virtually having terminated its foreign aid programme during the Cultural 
Revolution, China undertook an ambitious programme of economic assistance to 
developing countries in the early 1970s. New aid extensions rose from US$16 million 
in 1969 to about US$640 million per year for the next four years. The new Chinese 
aid programme was ambitious and within two years China extended more aid to the 
Third World than in the sixteen years between its initial aid disbursements in Africa 
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and the end of the Cultural Revolution, 1954 – 1969. During this period new aid 
policies were nearly ten times the annual level attained in the 1950s and 1960s.73 
After five years of negotiations between China, Tanzania and Zambia, the final 
protocol was signed and construction of the prestigious Tanzania-Zambia (Tan-Zam) 
railroad began in 1970. The Tan-Zam railway was China’s single largest foreign aid 
project, costing over US$455 million. It was equal to nearly one half of China’s total 
aid commitments to all African countries in the period 1954-1971 and at the time was 
by far the largest construction project in both Tanzania and Zambia.74 In terms of cost, 
the Tan-Zam railway far outranked the Soviet Union’s biggest aid project in Africa, 
the Aswan Dam project in Egypt. Previous proposals for financial assistance to build 
a railway between the two countries had been submitted to the World Bank, an 
Anglo-Canadian Consortium and the Soviet Union, however all proposals had been 
rejected on grounds that economic development in the two countries would be better 
served by other projects.75   
 
The project itself is a single-track railway line linking Dar es Salaam to the copper-
rich, central Zambian town, Kapiri Mposhi, 1850 kilometres away.  The railway runs 
through some of the most rugged land in eastern Africa which necessitated the need to 
build 2500 bridges and viaducts, and nineteen tunnels. Construction finished two 
years ahead of schedule in 1974 with a workforce of roughly 15 000 Chinese and 36 
000 Tanzanians and Zambians. The aid was given in the form of an interest free loan 
to be paid over a thirty-year period and payment would only commence in 1981.76 At 
the time of completion this meant that both Tanzania and Zambia would have to find 
US$2.7 million a year in order to complete payment. However, it was expected that 
the railway would ultimately pay for itself and also raise a surplus to help pay for the 
loan. The main freight would be copper from Zambia. It was also hoped that the line 
would assist in the agricultural development of southwest Tanzania.77 Today the Tan-
Zam railroad is still functional but has never been profitable, nor has it carried the 
projected volume of traffic, owing partly to the congestion at the port of Dar es 
Salaam and partly to problems with track and rolling stock. Political changes in 
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southern Africa have lessened the need to use northern routes. South African ports are 
being used more and copper is also trucked through Namibia’s Caprivi Strip.78 As a 
result in 2005, the governments of Tanzania and Zambia agreed to privatise the Tan-
Zam.79    
 
The Tan-Zam railroad is an excellent example indicating how the political advantages 
of building the railroad outweighed the economic considerations. From the outset 
China was seen to be a friend of two African countries sorely in need of help. The 
West had refused to provide funding for the project but China’s willingness to 
construct the railroad highlighted the political alignments in southern Africa. 
Therefore the offer to build the railroad won friends not just in the two countries 
benefiting from the railway, but also amongst all independent African nations 
opposed to white supremacist rule. Thus the project had the real and symbolic 
meaning of supporting Africa’s total liberation. International prestige was attached to 
such a massive and difficult project by illustrating China’s technological capabilities 
and power of building a major industrial project. It bolstered Mao Tse Tung’s bid for 
leadership of the developing world and represented a triumph over the West. The 
West had had a chance to build the railway but had turned the opportunity down, and 
as a result China and Africa had built the line together, symbolising their own 
technological capabilities and socio-economic values.80 By using Chinese technology 
and resources the construction of the railway ensured a continued Chinese presence in 
eastern Africa.81 Lastly, in constructing the Tan-Zam, China had won a struggle with 
the Soviet Union; it had built a bigger project than Moscow in Africa.82 
 
2.8. Chinese Recognition at the United Nations 
 
Perhaps one of the greatest examples of where Chinese aid won China political 
support was in 1971 when China was admitted into the United Nations. Copper 
                                                 
78 Seay, L. “Missed Perception and Missed Opportunity: US policy and the Tanzania-Zambia Rail 
road”, Department of Governemnt, University of Texas, Austin, Speech delivered at the Annual 
Meeting of African Studies Association, November 2004, p.10. 
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/content/research_papers/asa_papers/seayasa04.pdf  
79 Wikipedia, “TAZARA Railway”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanzania-
Zambia_Railway_Authority, April 2006 
80 Yu, G. T., Op cit  p.104 
81 Hutchinson, A., Op cit, p.225 
82 Copper, J.F., Op cit, p.108 
 37
believes that China’s foremost goal in giving aid to African countries was to win 
diplomatic recognition. The main reason was that at this stage China was still on the 
sidelines of international affairs and was not recognised as a world power. 83  
Furthermore, in terms of the Sino-Soviet struggle, fighting along their common 
borders had become serious and the Soviets had turned the conflict into a world-wide 
effort to isolate and contain China. With membership in the UN, China would be able 
to balance the Soviet threat by getting support from the international community. 
Africa held out the highest possibility for China to increase its diplomatic ties, 
especially considering that more nations in Africa than in any other region of the 
world had no commitments to Taipei – the then-current seat at the UN. 84  It is 
interesting to note that at this stage that there are 53 countries in Africa, which 
account for roughly half the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and 
nearly one third of the members of the UN.  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s all loans made by China were low-interest loans, usually 
from less than 1% to 2.5%. From the late 1960s these low-interest loans were 
gradually replaced by interest-free loans. However, from the beginning of the 1970s 
China announced that all loans would be provided with no interest.85 (This was still 
the major trend in Beijing’s foreign aid programme during the 1990s). From the time 
when China initiated aid in 1953 until the end of the Cold War in 1990, the highest 
amount of Chinese aid (US$ 1.1 billion) was given in 1970 - the year before China 
won the seat at the UN. The aid given in 1970 was almost double to the next highest 
amount (US$ 690 million) given two years later. See Table 2.2.  
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 Table 2.1: Beijing’s Foreign Aid Commitment and the number of Recipient 
Countries, 1953-1990 (US$ million)86  
Year Aid amount No. of 
recipients 
Year Aid amount No. of 
recipients 
1953 120.0 1 1972 690.9 23 
1954 17.5 1 1973 495.0 13 
1955 340.0 1 1974 336.0 15 
1956 102.8 6 1975 501.3 15 
1957 40.7 2 1976 150.1 10 
1958 118.9 7 1977 149.9 10 
1959 185.4 3 1978 157.3 9 
1960 287.7 5 1979 275.9 4 
1961 435.7 6 1980 198.3 7 
1962 22.3 4 1981 41.8 7 
1963 127.3 4 1982 80.1 10 
1964 235.5 8 1983 114.4 28 
1965 367.6 9 1984 467.3 32 
1966 251.6 7 1985 248.6 35 
1967 474.0 9 1986 303.6 26 
1968 349.8 5 1987 272.0 25 
1969 10.3 5 1988 60.4 13 
1970 1,111.3 11 1989 223.5 24 
1971 590.0 13 1990 374.6 43 
 
On 26 October 1971 at the UN General Assembly, the Albanian Resolution, which 
seated China at the UN and expelled Taiwan, was adopted. Of the seventy-six 
countries that voted in China’s favour, twenty-six were from Africa, accounting for 
more than one third of the total votes. Fifteen of the sixteen African countries that 
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China had given aid to voted in favour of the Albanian resolution. The Central 
African Republic was the only country which did not vote for China (See Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2: Voting of the African Recipients of Chinese Aid on the Admission of 
China to the UN (Albanian Resolution 1971)87 
Country Vote Country Vote 
Algeria Yes Mauritania Yes 
Central African Republic No Morocco Yes 
Congo (Brazzaville) Yes Somalia Yes 
Ethiopia Yes Sudan Yes 
Ghana Yes Tunisia Yes 
Guinea Yes Uganda Yes 
Kenya Yes Tanzania Yes 
Mali Yes Zambia Yes 
 
Therefore, looking at the large sum of aid given in 1970 (Table 3.1) and the number 
of votes received from those countries a year later (Table 3.2); it could be said that 
China’s diplomatic efforts in Africa, based largely on aid giving, primarily influenced 
the UN vote. Later when expressing his appreciation, Mao said that it was China’s 
African friends who had carried them back to the UN.88 Having been voted onto the 
UN one of China’s biggest objectives had been achieved, with the support of the 
African countries she was recognised as a world power and a member of the Third 
World. 
 
 2.9. The era of Deng Xiaoping 
 
China’s foreign aid extensions dropped drastically in the latter part of the 1970s, from 
approximately $600 million per year from 1970 – 1973 to an average of $324 million 
per year during 1974 – 1975, and to an average of $170 million per year in 1977 – 
1978. 89  This decline in foreign assistance seems to have been caused by several 
factors. By the mid-1970s China had already achieved the goals that had prompted it 
                                                 
87 Copper, J.F., Op cit, p.13 
88 Guijin, F.,  “Sino-African Relations and China’s African Policy”, Lecture given at the Department of 
African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Africa, 2000, p.9 
89 Harding, H., Op cit, p.275 
 40
to increase its foreign aid programme in the first place: it had become a member of the 
United Nations; it had diplomatic relations with most developing nations; and it was 
regarded as a major force in the developing world. However from the mid-1970s, 
from a domestic point of view, China itself was experiencing serious domestic 
economic problems, which made it especially difficult to maintain the levels of 
foreign assistance Peking had been providing earlier in the decade.90 
 
Mao Zedong died in 1976 (incidentally Chou En-lai died in the same year) and a two-
year transitional period (1976-1978) ensued under the leadership of Moa’s 
handpicked successor, Hua Guofeng. However, this short period had little if any 
influence on China’s foreign policy strategy.91  
 
When Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, China’s economy was in dire straits. 
Mao’s policies: The Great Leap Forward in the 1960s and the Cultural Revolution 
shortly thereafter had seriously injured the Chinese economy. China was in desperate 
need of a stable and peaceful international environment in order to pursue its own 
modernisation efforts. Therefore, it was at this time that China initiated a major 
strategic reorientation of foreign policy, shifting its support for proletarian revolution 
and anti-imperialist wars of national liberation to the establishment of new foreign 
relations intended to support domestic economic reform and development.92  
 
During the Deng era the economic relations between China and Africa shifted from 
China providing economic assistance to Africa to developing economic and trade co-
operation with African countries on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. 
Deng repeatedly expounded the importance of developing Sino-Africa relations. 
Starting in 1983, as the economic and financial situation in China improved, China’s 
foreign aid began to slowly increase. Between December 1982 and January 1983, 
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited 11 African countries. During his trip Ziyang 
announced four principles guiding China’s economic and technical co-operation with 
African states. They were: 1) equality and mutual benefit; 2) a stress on practical 
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results; 3) diversity in form; and 4) attainment of common progress. 93  The four 
principles essentially built on the original eight principles of economic co-operation.  
African countries were encouraged by Deng to find political and economic models of 
development to suit their own particular circumstances and thus finally end the drive 
for Maoist revolutionary ideology. The main theme’s of foreign policy under Deng 
was peace and development, as opposed to Mao’s war and revolution. 
 
Domestic issues and economic reform within China became the primary focus, and 
foreign policy, at least in Africa, took a back seat until the mid-1990s. Deng 
continued to follow Mao’s normalised relations with the US. China had emerged from 
isolation to the world community and a solid foundation had been laid for the next 
phase of reformation. Good relations with the US were encouraged. Deng knew that 
Western financial support was very important to China.94 Good relations with the US 
would give China access to the scientific and technological knowledge and equipment 
necessary for national development. The dramatic international events such as the 
collapse of both the Soviet Union and the bipolar system and the end of the Cold War, 
did little to influence Chinese foreign policy. In fact China’s foreign relations 
maintained considerable continuity.  China’s essential strategy under Deng was to 
ensure China’s economic modernisation and development.95 Deng continued to rule 
China until his death in 1995.  
 
2.10. Conclusion 
 
Through the above analysis it is hoped that certain characteristics of Chinese foreign 
policy in Africa during the Cold War are identified. The main aim is to illustrate how 
Chinese aid policies benefited China politically. This was done in a number of ways.  
 
Firstly, in a chronological order of events. The tribute system was identified as a 
philosophy, which the Chinese Empire established several centuries ago. It was used 
to manage foreign relationships with the empire and the basic characteristics of the 
tribute system are still evident in Chinese foreign policy today. The 1954 Bandung 
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conference marked the first time China and Africa had any sort of official contact in 
over five centuries. It was at this conference that China proposed the “Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-existence” and shortly thereafter China increased its efforts to develop 
economic and cultural contacts in Africa. When Chou En-lai made his African tour in 
1964, this was the first time such a large Chinese delegation had visited Africa and it 
was also the first time China explicitly set out its principles for foreign aid. However 
by the time Mao’s Cultural Revolution was taking place, China had developed an 
inward looking policy dealing primarily with domestic issues. During this stage 
China’s foreign aid decreased substantially. 
 
Secondly, in terms of the international environment. During the Cold War China had 
a number of foreign policy goals it was trying to achieve. The most pertinent included 
the diversification and expansion its economy, gain international recognition and 
influence, achieve a position of leadership among the developing world countries, and 
undermine Western influence. However in the early 1950s China had little 
international standing, but Africa’s increasing, newly independent states provided 
wonderful opportunities for China to attain these goals. As tensions between the 
Soviet Union and China escalated, China sought new possibilities to gain support. It 
increasingly shifted its aid to Africa and often favoured revolutionary nations. The 
Brezhnev doctrine and the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 finally persuaded 
African leaders that the Soviet Union was in fact just another imperialist power. 
 
Thirdly, by concrete examples. The Tan-Zam railway is a very good example which 
indicates how the political advantages of building the railway outweighed the 
economic considerations. Significant aid disbursements a year before China won the 
UN Security Council seat could indicate how many of the African countries decisions 
were influenced to vote in favour of China because of these aid agreements. Despite 
not being an economically lucrative project and its need of frequent repairs, today the 
Tan-Zam railroad is still quoted as being one of the greatest Chinese aid projects in 
Africa.  
 
Finally, the era of Deng Xiaoping. Under Deng China had a major foreign policy 
reorientation. China shifted its support from revolutionary and anti-imperialist 
governments to policies that supported its economic reform both within China and the 
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recipient country.  Deng’s influence in the post-Cold War era will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Chinese Aid during the Post Cold War era (1990-2000) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Bloc politics and ideological differences were very important to Western countries at 
the end of the Cold War. However to China these points were less important, instead 
national interests, especially economic interests had become dominant.96 In other 
words, up until the end of the Cold War China’s aid was used primarily as a vehicle to 
export its programme of proletarian internationalism (it was very idealistic). However 
during the 1990s, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and from 1995 under Jiang 
Zemin, Chinese aid evolved to have two strategic aims. The first was an increased 
focus on enhancing its own economic self-interest and the second was integrating 
China into the international community. Africa proved to be an increasingly vital 
player in helping China realise these aims – especially after the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident. At the same time aid was used in ways that would further or compliment 
China’s foreign policy objectives. Diplomatically China’s aid was able to win over its 
African allies at the UN, and economically China’s aid projects were now structured 
so as to ensure maximum economic gain. 
 
This chapter will start by looking at China’s Africa policy in the pre-Tiananmen 
Square crisis. At this stage Africa’s relations with China were marginal, economic 
assistance had come to a standstill, and China was exerting all its efforts into rather 
attracting foreign direct investment from the West. However the West’s 
condemnation of China after its Tiananmen Square crackdown forced China to 
reconsider its stance on Africa relations. This chapter will also follow Jiang’s policies 
on the continent which, more than any other time in the history of the relations 
between the regions thus far, placed economic cooperation with African states at the 
forefront of its relations with the continent. These economic policies also 
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revolutionised Chinese aid to the region. Finally, after reviewing China’s aid policies 
to Africa through the 1990s, this chapter will look at China’s publication of its 1998 
White Paper. The White Paper expressed for the first time, China’s need for natural 
resources to ensure its overall national security. 
    
3.2. Deng Xiaoping and the Pre-Tiananmen crisis 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, China’s primary foreign policy aim under Deng 
was to promote China’s economic development. Deng realised that maintaining world 
peace and stability was crucial to achieving this aim. A few years after coming to 
power Deng said: ‘We should continue to carry out our foreign policy of opposing 
hegemonism and work to safeguard peace. Its successful application will enable us to 
secure a peaceful environment in which to carry out our reconstruction for a relatively 
long period.”97 As the world rushed toward the end of the Cold War, China’s relations 
with Africa took the back seat – yet again.  
 
Towards the end of the Cold War, two distinct reasons had emerged to explain 
China’s decreased relations with Africa. Firstly, bloc politics were thawing and China 
realised that its rational to back anti-Soviet (and anti-American) elements on the 
continent were largely irrelevant. Thus, in terms of Sino-US relations, China no 
longer saw Africa as a source of disagreement as had been the case in the past, 
especially the 1970s. As a result, China took an increasingly tough stance against 
Africa’s demands for aid and assistance.98 China built a number of “monumental” 
projects such as sports stadiums and auditoriums. These projects were attractive to the 
Chinese because they did not involve complicated problems of raw materials and 
marketing, which were posed by industrial projects.99 Requests from Guinea and Mali 
to build another railway similar to the Tan-Zam railway were turned down, as was a 
request to build a dam on the border between Mali and Senegal. Furthermore, China 
also declined to give any substantial aid to Nigeria – the most populous country on the 
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continent.100 In 1985 Deng criticised the developing world’s errors in policy-making. 
When addressing President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, on his first trip to China in 
1989, Deng said that African countries should take advantage of the peaceful 
environment to develop. “Strategies and policies for development should be worked 
out in accordance with actual conditions in each country, and they should unite so that 
all their people can work together to promote economic development”.101  
 
Secondly, in order to modernise the life of 1.1 billion Chinese, the government needed 
to attract foreign investment and technological assistance. African states had been 
unsuccessful in making progress in terms of modernisation. They had failed to 
efficiently liberalise their economies and open up to the international market. This 
was a big obstacle for Chinese economic aims. Basically, Africa was seen as 
immaterial to China’s increasingly commercial nature of external relations and chase 
for modernisation.102 However, despite China’s more stringent policies in Africa, 
China continued to remain friendly with African nations and issues about South-South 
relations were still discussed, although they were now backed solely by rhetoric rather 
than concrete commitments. During the 1980s China’s aid to Africa had either 
stagnated or declined (see Table 3.1). Africa was now expected to contribute to the 
maintenance of many of the aid projects, which had never been the case before, and 
from the mid-1980s there was also a noticeable lack of high-level visits from China to 
Africa. Africa’s political importance was increasingly ignored and by the late 1980s it 
had suffered a comparative decline in Chinese foreign policy.  
 
Table 3.1: Chinese Aid to Africa during the 1980s (US$)103 
Year  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Amount 157 412 390 309 222.5 262 230 306 
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3.3. Post-Tiananmen Crisis 
 
Things took a dramatic turn after the Tiananmen incident on 4 June 1989. Countries 
which had been trading with China such as the United States, Europe and Japan, 
condemned China for its human rights abuses and economic sanctions were imposed 
on China. As a result of the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square pro-
democracy protests the European Union (EU) and the US immediately imposed an 
embargo on weapon sales to China (the arms embargo remains in place 17 years after 
the incident).104 The sharp international reaction to China’s suppression of the 
Tiananmen protests seemed to have caught the Chinese leaders by surprise. Up until 
this moment China had been perceived by the West as going through a much-
applauded modernisation programme with social and economic consequences. 
Favourable treatment was given to China, throughout the 1980s, in the hope that 
China was being remade in the West’s self-image.105 Furthermore, until this time 
complaints about China’s forced labour system, public executions and lack of 
democracy were never mentioned in the Western media or by Western policy-makers. 
China felt that criticism for its human rights abuses began only once it started to 
develop. The Tiananmen Square incident had ended China’s honeymoon period with 
the West. 
 
However, despite pressure from the West, most African countries refused to criticize 
China. The governments of Mauritania, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, and Gabon issued 
statements saying that the Tiananmen incident was an internal affair and voiced their 
opposition to foreign interference in China’s domestic affairs. Angola’s Foreign 
Minister and Namibia’s Sam Nujoma sent telegrams of congratulations and “support 
for the resolute actions to quell the anti-revolutionary rebellion.”106 Where high level 
contact had been suspended between the West and China, several African leaders 
visited China to demonstrate support for the Chinese government. Captain Blaise 
Compaore of Burkina Faso was the first foreign head of state to visit Beijing after the 
killing. He was rewarded with a loan and a children’s playground for his country.107 It 
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is interesting to note that Compaore had seized power via a coup, executed his 
predecessor, and was himself widely criticised for human rights abuses – hardly the 
kind of man any government would like to be associated with. Compaore’s visit was 
followed by heads of state from Burundi, Uganda, Togo, Mali in 1989 and the 
presidents of Egypt, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone 
and Sudan in 1990. The visits were hailed by China as proof that the international 
community was not united in its condemnation of China’s efforts to crush its 
democracy movement.  
 
African states blocked any attempts from Western states aimed at condemning 
China’s human rights record at the United Nations. African governments supported 
the argument that human rights violations are a domestic matter and should not be the 
concern of the international community. It is worth mentioning once again that 
African states makes up one third of all UN members (and half of the Non-Aligned 
Movement). Taylor gives three main reasons for Africa’s poles-apart reaction 
compared to that of the West. Firstly, African elites, who committed human rights 
abuses in their own country, were under threat from democratisation projects 
themselves. Any public uprising of a section of the population against entrenched elite 
threatened to set an example that Africans could follow. Secondly, Third World 
solidarity resulted in resentment at Western “neo-imperialist” interference in the 
affairs of a fellow developing country. Many African countries viewed the West’s 
emphasis on human rights abuses as a pretext to undermine China’s development and 
interfere in its own path to modernisation. And thirdly, a realistic understanding that 
overt criticism of China could mean an end to Chinese developmental aid.108 It is 
important to keep in mind that from 1956 to 1987, China had provided Africa with 
nearly US$4.783 million of economic aid and assistance, which accounted for 62% of 
the total of China’s overseas assistance, and a source of assistance African countries 
were not willing to give up.109  
 
After the Tiananmen incident, China’s attitude toward the Third World, especially 
African nations, changed from benign neglect to that of renewed emphasis and as a 
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result the developing world was elevated in Chinese thinking to become a cornerstone 
of China’s foreign policy. China announced that “from now on China will put more 
effort into resuming and developing relations with old friends (in Africa) and Third 
World countries.”110 And China did just that, starting off in the summer of 1989, 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen set off on a very successful, six-nation African tour, 
including Tunisia, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire and Lesotho. By June 1992, Qian had visited 
fourteen African countries on what had become annual visits to the continent. China 
offered aid to any supportive state, a move characteristic of the time. For example, 
Mozambique was granted a US$12 million financial reward, for its political 
understanding and support during one of Qian’s visits.111 Chinese aid and the number 
of its recipients increased radically in the post-Tiananmen era as China tried to win 
over allies and sympathetic friends (see Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2: China’s Foreign Aid Commitments, 1988-1992 (US$ million)112 
Year Amount No. of 
recipients 
Year Amount No. of 
recipients 
1988 60.4 13 1991 302.9 36 
1989 223.5 24 1992 345.0 44 
1990 374.6 43    
 
3.4. Jiang Zemin from the mid 1990s 
 
Until the mid-1990s China, under Deng Xiaoping, had adopted a low-profile strategy 
to ensure that China’s economic modernisation would not be disturbed and that China 
would continue to seize every opportunity to develop its economy. On the global level 
though, China became increasingly wary of the threat posed from a new and possibly 
uncontested hegemon, the US which, it was feared, would hold back China’s rise as a 
global political power. Thus, China centred on a foreign policy pushing for a 
multipolar world and its Africa policy became the centre of that policy. China’s policy 
in Africa became centred on gaining support from African states whilst China felt 
under pressure from the West. In mid-1995 China embarked on an intensive 
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diplomatic campaign in Africa. This campaign also marked the dividing point 
marking Jiang’s solo reign.113 
 
It may be no coincidence that at the time of Jiang’s concerted Africa campaign, China 
had just lost a no-action motion proposed for the condemnation of China’s human 
rights record at the UN in Geneva in March 1995. Furthermore, it may be no 
coincidence that the countries singled out for high-level visits, were for the most part 
members of the commission.114 In October-November 1995, well before the 1996 
commission convened, vice premier, Li Lanqing travelled to Mali, Guinea, Senegal, 
Gabon, Cameroon and Cot d’Ivoire. Of these, all but Senegal were on the commission. 
Qiao Shi, a member of the Central Committee, visited Egypt – another key member 
on the commission.115 Many countries managed to get some sort of bilateral 
agreement signed. For example, Mali signed agreements on economic and 
technological cooperation and promised to assist Mali in building several factories.116 
Gabon stressed the importance of its relationship with China and the rights of 
developing nations. All seven countries included on these high-level visits voted 
against the proposed condemnation of China’s human rights record in Geneva in April 
1996. Again in 1997, when several Western countries submitted a human rights 
proposal at the 53rd session on the commission, China’s motion of “no action” was 
approved by a vote of 27 to17. Fourteen of the 27 votes were from African states.117 
Such motions were seen by many African nations as unnecessary interference by the 
West in the internal affairs of developing countries.118 Once again, China had 
achieved its goal of diplomatic support through the power of the African vote. 
 
Starting from mid-1995, high level visits from China to Africa became increasingly 
frequent (and continue unabated today). In that year alone three vice premiers, Zhu 
Rongji, Li Lanqing and Qian Qichen, visited several African states. Most notably, the 
states visited were the states which were sitting on the commission at the UN. Chinese 
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experiences and lessons on reform were introduced, as was the Chinese government’s 
support for Africa’s efforts in its economic development. The vice premiers also 
encouraged cooperation and joint ventures between Chinese and African enterprises. 
At the conclusion of his visit, Zhu said that with greater political stability, the 
Southern African region offered a new opportunity for economic development.119 The 
high-level visits seemed to pay-off and in 1995, China’s trade with Africa had risen 
67% from the previous year (see Table 3.3) and Chinese companies had signed 4 742 
agreements on contracted projects and labour cooperation.120  
 
Table 3.3: China’s Total Trade with Africa in the 1990s (US$ million)121 
Year Amount Year Amount 
1990 1 665 1995 3 921 
1991 1 426 1996 4 027 
1992 1 806 1997 5 030 
1993 2 531 1998 5 600 
1994 2 643 1999 6 484 
 
From 8-22 May 1996 President Jiang Zemin visited six African countries. This was a 
momentous trip as it was the first time the Chinese president had ever visited the 
continent, it was regarded as an important step in consolidating Sino-African relations. 
Jiang visited Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe. While in 
Ethiopia, Jiang addressed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and put forward a 
five-point proposal on developing a long-term and stable relationship of all-round 
cooperation with all African countries. The five points included the following: to 
foster a sincere relationship and become each other’s reliable “all-weather” friends; to 
treat each other as equals, respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from 
interfering in each others internal affairs; to seek common development on the basis 
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of mutual benefit; to increase consultation and cooperation in internal affairs; and to 
look to the future and create a more peaceful world.122 Jiang had signed 23 economic 
and technological cooperative agreements with the six countries he had visited.123 A 
year later in order to further develop relations and expand cooperation amongst 
African states, Chinese Premier Li Ping visited Zambia, Mozambique, Gabon, 
Cameroon, Nigeria, Tanzania, and the Seychelles. After Li’s visit China decided to 
grant preferential loans with governmental interest deductions to enterprises engaged 
in specific projects in Africa.124 The implementation of a number of projects was 
accelerated and the scale of aid to advance commercial cooperation was enlarged.125  
 
During these high-level visits, which remained steady through to the end of 1990s, 
one repeated theme cropped up again and again, and that was how to improve Sino-
African economic cooperation. Jiang’s Africa trip also came remarkably soon after 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996 where China was warned that the US would 
intervene militarily and support Taiwan if China used force to unite with Taiwan. 
China was shaken by the unchallenged US hegemon and realised it needed to counter 
this threat by strengthening its ties with the region which had in the past supported it 
unconditionally, that is, Africa. (The Taiwan issue will be discussed at length in 
chapter 6.) 
 
3.5. The 1998 White Paper from the Chinese Ministry of Defence 
 
Deng’s economic reforms were in full swing during the 1990s, foreign investment 
was pouring in from all over the world, and China’s economy was growing at an 
unprecedented rate (between 8 -10%). As with any growing economy China’s reliance 
on natural resources was also growing. Moreover, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
exposed the vulnerability of China’s outward-orientated economy to external shocks 
and alerted China to the risks of economic interdependence. In 1998 the Chinese 
Ministry of Defence released a White paper. The paper stated that struggles centred 
on markets, natural resources and other economic rights and interests were 
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intensifying globally and that economic security, which is linked to energy security, 
was very important to China’s overall security.126 As a result China’s global, 
economic, and foreign and security policies have become closely intertwined. The 
release of the 1998 White Paper was the first time China explicitly expressed its need 
for natural resources and how that was linked to its overall national security. Regional 
and international stability became Chinese strategic objectives, which led to Beijing 
stepping up its efforts to expand its oil imports and diversify its oil suppliers. This 
policy led to an increase in oil imports and African suppliers to China127 and set in 
motion the measures that would lead to the China-Africa Forum.   
 
3.6. Chinese Aid in the 1990s 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, China’s foreign aid system went through significant 
restructuring where China began to use its limited foreign aid funds to achieve 
maximum economic gain and to diversify its recipients. Pure bilateral inter-
governmental economic and technical cooperation in the traditional form of project 
construction was no longer meeting the needs of the time. Therefore in an effort to 
better spread economic aid to the needs of the recipient countries, China began 
delivering “contracted projects” carried out through bilateral cooperation innitiatives. 
Basically, loans would be used by the recipient country either as a direct state 
investment or as a re-granted loan to a local company so that capital could be used to 
establish a joint venture with a Chinese company. In this way, the amount of funding 
flowing into the recipient country would increase because the Chinese partner could 
also make its own investment through which it would become responsible for 
management and operation. Technical and management skills would be imparted to 
the local partner through the process of the operation of the joint venture.128 Projects 
involved copper and chromium mining, the petroleum industry, forestry, agriculture 
and fisheries. 
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Similarly, when Jiang made his five-point proposal, the following was mentioned in 
relation to the third point “seek common development on the basis of mutual 
development”. China would continue to provide “government assistance” to African 
countries with no political strings attached. An emphasis was made on revitalising 
assistance projects which China had sponsored in the past through establishing 
cooperative joint-ventures. Chinese companies would also be encouraged to conduct 
mutually beneficial cooperation in extensive areas.129 In an interview in late 1998, the 
Chinese director of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu 
Guijin, stated that there were three major ways in aiding foreign countries: favourable 
loans with the interest paid by the Chinese government; joint-ventures and 
cooperative companies in foreign aid projects; and aid grants.130 Some of the biggest 
projects carried out after Jiang’s visit included: in 1997 the construction of an oil 
refinery in the Sudan, contracted by the China Petroleum and Construction Company 
(CPECC) and a year later CPECC signed another contract for a petroleum export 
equipment project also in the Sudan; the blast furnace refurbishing for Ziscosteel in 
Zimbabwe; and the railway refurbishing project in Nigeria undertaken by the China 
Civil Construction and Engineering Company.131 Investment, development and trade 
centres were also set up across the continent to promote China’s trade and 
development objectives. The trade centres were designed to provide a host of services, 
including storage, offices, accommodation, customs entries, insurance, transportation, 
business tours, account settlement, legal advice, and accounting assistance for 
Chinese organisations that invested in Africa.132 
  
Thus, it would seem that by the 1990s aid projects had become commercial projects 
that generated funds for both the recipient country and China. Gone were the days of 
monumental political projects which had been fairly common in the preceding 
years.133  
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3.7. Conclusion 
 
It is hoped that this chapter was able to illustrate the pivotal role African states played 
in helping China achieve its strategic aims, and the role Chinese aid played in 
coercing African states to support China. In the pre-Tiananmen era we notice that 
China had marginalised Africa as it did not compliment its growing economic needs. 
Instead, China focused on building economic ties with developed states, especially in 
the West. However, after the Tiananmen incident those same countries condemned 
China for its human rights abuses and economic sanctions were imposed. African 
governments on the other hand, refused to criticise China and repeatedly stated that 
Tiananmen incident was a domestic matter which did not need interference from 
outside parties. Aid packages also encouraged African states, especially autocratic and 
repressive governments, to block any mention of China’s human rights abuses at the 
UN. 
 
African states had their own reasons for supporting China. Resentment toward the 
West’s neo-imperialist intervention strengthened Africa’s Third World solidarity as 
well as an understanding that criticism of China’s human rights abuses could end 
China’s aid. African states which make up one third of the UN membership embraced 
China and helped it achieve one of its biggest strategic aims, that of integrating itself 
with the international community and as a by-product also gaining support from all 
those states. This was carried out particularly well by China when it increased the 
amount of aid and the number of its aid recipients.  
 
Under Jiang China’s Africa relations focused progressively more on its second 
strategic aim, that of enhancing its own economic self-interests and as a result, 
methods to improve Sino-African economic cooperation became the cornerstone of 
China’s Africa policy. An increasing number of high-level visits from China to Africa 
boosted the number of trade, economic and technological cooperative agreements and 
helped consolidate relations between the two regions.  
 
The release of the White Paper from the Chinese Ministry of Defence in 1998 
confirmed that with China’s fast-growing economy and its need for a steady and 
reliable source of oil, its need for natural resources and global economic rights was 
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also intensifying and thus very important to China’s overall security. China began to 
increase its oil imports and diversify its oil suppliers. The scene had been set for the 
creation of the China-Africa forum. 
 
Chinese aid during the 1990s also evolved. Project construction was replaced with 
bilateral contracted projects. These projects formed joint-ventures with Chinese 
companies which emphasised maximum profit. Also, China had begun to dramatically 
increase and diversify its aid recipients; this was a successful measure which China 
would build after the CACF was established. 
 
In conclusion, it would appear that China managed to achieve its goals in the 1990s, 
namely integrating itself into the international community and enhancing its economic 
self-interest. As a result, Chinese aid had shifted its focus from once-off monumental 
projects to projects which were engineered to ensure China would gain maximum 
economic returns. Where China had marginalised Africa at the beginning of the 
decade, Africa’s growing importance to China could not be underestimated when the 
decade came to a close, and the world entered the new millennium.      
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Chapter 4 
 
The China Africa Cooperation Forum: A catapult for China-Africa engagement 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
China’s interests in Africa have shifted over the years, from the Cold War era where 
China used its aid policies to help it become leader of the Third World, to the 1990s, 
an era of peaceful coexistence and economic growth, to the present where China is 
expanding its spheres of influence and ensuring continued and diverse access to 
energy and natural resources. During the 1990s the aim of Chinese aid became 
infused with enhancing its own economic self interest and integrating the PRC with 
the donor community.  However, despite these aims, China failed to transplant its own 
experiences from home. Its aid did not have much incentive to develop a full 
understanding of Africa’s social formation and economic characteristics. However, as 
China’s economy grew, these perceptions needed to change if China was to gain 
access to a continued and diversified source of natural resources and energy. Thus, 
from the mid-1990s, aid was increasingly directed toward broader strategic objectives, 
and in particular toward the development of links with resource-rich countries. The 
China Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) was a big step in consolidating China-
Africa relations.  
 
China’s successful engagement with Africa has happened for a number of reasons. 
This chapter seeks to explore the factors and the events which made this possible. 
This chapter will begin by looking at what factors China and Africa find attractive in 
each other. This is followed by the creation of the CACF and a discussion looking at 
the policies and follow-up actions that emerged from the summit and the two summits 
which followed in 2003 and 2006. Aid and debt forgiveness will be looked at in detail 
as will China’s need for natural resources. China’s trade and investment policies on 
the continent are closely linked to China’s need for natural resources. The last half of 
the chapter will look at the challenges and obstacles arising from China’s Africa 
relations. Areas of mutual cooperation will be covered and before concluding the 
implications of future Sino-Africa aid relations will be covered.   
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4.2. Mutual Attraction 
 
Economic and diplomatic relations between China and Africa has increased 
exceptionally since the mid-1990s. Africa’s importance to China can be summed up 
in three primary reasons: 1) ensuring national security, 2) carrying out political 
objectives and 3) altruistic reasons. In terms of ensuring national security, Africa is a 
resource-rich continent, and China’s access to these resources is probably its key 
motive for befriending African states. Natural resources are essential to feed China’s 
rapid economic growth and thus maintain internal stability. Economic growth is the 
cornerstone of social stability and is thus also linked to national security. Therefore 
China’s search for new markets and investment opportunities is essential in this 
regard. Since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese government’s political 
objectives have been linked to the country becoming a great power and playing a 
more prominent role internationally. However, one of China’s biggest foreign policy 
concerns is the US hegemony. China fears that the US may prevent it from rising as a 
superpower. Therefore, building strong relations with countries across the world is 
essential to countering the US and ensuring a multipolar world order, rather than the 
current unipolar world order. African countries have proved to be successful in 
backing China, mostly because of the large number of states on the continent and the 
historical links each region share with each other. Lastly, although not the strongest 
motivation, China does have altruistic reasons for wanting to help poorer developing 
countries by providing technical, medical and agricultural assistance.134 
 
At the same time China too is attractive to African states. As a developing country 
that is increasing in global status, African states believe that the two regions share a 
similar world view, which is often expressed in China’s south-south rhetoric. Linked 
to this, is the fact that China is the only developing country in the world to hold a seat 
on the UNSC and is willing to align itself with the developing countries. Another 
factor is centred on China’s assistance. China’s aid is not linked to any conditions – 
apart from the one-China principle – and believes strongly in the notion of non-
interference of the internal affairs within a country. Western donors on the other hand 
impose conditions of good governance, human rights and democracy before financial 
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support is handed out.135 China is not a former colonial ruler and thus does not have 
to deal with any colonial legacies and as a result Africans feel more comfortable 
making trade and investment deals with the Chinese. China also represents a growing 
market for African goods and offers an alternative to Africa’s traditional reliance on 
the West. Lastly, China’s economic achievements inspire many African states to 
develop, if a once impoverished nation can raise itself to the position of third 
strongest economy in the world, despite its own colonial past, then so can Africa.136 
This is reflected in what an Ethiopian businessman said “China is going through what
we hope to go through, and it did it recently, not 10
 
0 or 150 years ago”.137 
                                                
 
4.3. China-Africa Cooperation Forum 2000 
 
Jiang’s policies in Africa sought a commercially based partnership with the continent 
through the confirmation of Africa’s economic potential. Thus, in order ensure a 
strong and solid basis for Sino-African relations into the next century; China decided 
to convene the CACF. In October 1999, starting at the highest level, Jiang wrote to 
the heads of State of African countries and invited them to send their ministers to 
attend the forum which would be held a year later.138 As a result, in October 2000, the 
first large-scale conference on Sino-African cooperation was held in Beijing.139 
According to China, the purpose of the China Africa Cooperative Forum was “to 
conform to the changing international situation, meet the requirements of economic 
globalisation and seek co-development through negotiation and cooperation”140 
through equal negotiation, enhanced understanding, increased consensus, 
strengthening friendship and promoting cooperation with African states. Over 40 
African states with 80 foreign ministers and ministers in charge of international 
economic cooperation were present. In addition, 17 international and regional 
organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and entrepreneurs were in 
 
135 Ibid, p.100 
136 Versi, A., “A meeting of minds- and needs” in African Business, July 2006, p.19 
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138 Galal, M.N., “Sino-African Cooperative Forum” in ChinaAfrica, no.97, September 2000, p.9 
139 The Forum is to be held every three years, each time hosting will alternate between China and 
Africa states. The second forum was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003 and in 
November 2006 the third forum was held in Beijing. The fourth forum will be held in Egypt in 2009. 
140 No Author, “Creation of the Forum”, 10 December 2003, 
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attendance to discuss South-South cooperation, the North-South dialogue, debt relief, 
and Chinese economic cooperation with African states.141 
 
The conference produced two key documents, namely, the Beijing Declaration and 
the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economics and Social Development. 
The Beijing Declaration reflects the common views of China and the African states on 
major international and political issues and seeks to provide a framework for future 
China-Africa cooperation through support for the UN charter, the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, reform of the UN and international financial institutions, respect for 
human rights, and the expansion of existing areas of cooperation.142 The Programme 
for China-Africa Cooperation in Economics and Social Development elaborated on 
the purpose, plans and procedures of the two sides for boosting Sino-African 
cooperation in diverse sectors.143 This would be carried out through continued 
interaction of prior Sino-African relations; new emphasis on past activities; and brand 
new activities to expand the agenda of China-Africa cooperation.144 It described 
Chinese investments in Africa, financial cooperation between China and the African 
Development Bank (ADB), debt relief and cancellation, agricultural cooperation, 
natural resources and energy, education, and multilateral cooperation.145 The 
Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economics and Social Development 
indicated that in order for China’s economic growth to be satisfied, urgent expansion 
of commercial activities in Africa would have to take place. In his speech during the 
closing ceremony of the CACF, Premier Zhu Rongji stressed that “economic and 
trade cooperation constitutes a critical part”146 of China’s relations with Africa. Zhu’s 
speech indicated that China’s primary aim in Africa for present and future relations 
was economic interaction with Africa, meaning that political cooperation in the form 
of South-South interaction would only be a secondary aim.    
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4.4. China Africa Cooperation Forum in Addis Ababa 2003 
 
In December 2003 the second CACF was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. To ensure 
the implementation of the proposed actions at the previous CACF, China established a 
follow-up action committee consisting of 21 government departments. By the time the 
2003 CACF convened a number of follow-up actions had been completed. China had 
signed 40 trade agreements and 34 investment treaties with a number of African states. 
Chinese investors had established 117 new businesses in 49 African countries.147 It 
had wiped clean a collective debt worth US$1.27 billion for 31 African countries. 
China had also helped to build roads in Equatorial Guinea, dams in Morocco, an 
airport and nuclear reactor in Algeria, and government offices in Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti and Uganda.148 The main task for the second ministerial meeting would be to 
review the progress in the implementation of the two documents passed during the 
first ministerial meeting, and outlining a new, more focused action plan.    
 
The Addis Ababa Action Plan proposed cooperation in four, broad fields: 1) Political 
Affairs, Peace and Security; 2) Multilateral Cooperation; 3) Economic Development 
and 4) Social development. Let’s look at these fields in a little more detail. In terms of 
political affairs, peace and security, frequent high-level visits which led to high-level 
political dialogue and cooperation would continue. Since the first CACF more than 30 
African leaders had visited China, and President Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji also 
visited African countries a number of times. China renewed its promise to actively 
participate in African peacekeeping operations and increase its cooperation with 
organisations such as the UN, the African Union (AU), and other sub-regional 
organisations in Africa to help prevent, mediate and resolve African conflicts. China 
promised to help combat terrorism through close and effective cooperation with the 
African states, the UN and other international organisations.  
 
China stated that economic globalisation had reinforced interdependence amongst 
countries and regions and therefore brought more challenges than opportunities to 
developing countries. In this light, in terms of multilateral cooperation, two broad 
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objectives were covered. Firstly, China reaffirmed its support for African countries 
and their proposals for the restructuring of the UN, the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and other international organisations. Secondly, China strongly supports the 
AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) which leads to 
strong South-South cooperation and creates increased Chinese support for African 
development.   
 
The section under economic development has been the field where the Chinese have 
been the most active by far: 
Agriculture - China promised to expand agricultural support to African 
countries through technical support and training.  
Infrastructure – China pledged to continue to give assistance to African 
infrastructure projects, such as transport, telecommunications, energy, water-
supply and electricity. Particular focus would be given to land-locked 
countries. 
Trade – China’s trade with Africa had grown by more than 400% since 2000 
and reaching over US$40 billion.149 The trade balance sitting significantly in 
China’s favour, however in order to readdress the imbalance, China decided to 
grant zero-tariff treatment to some commodities from the least developed 
African countries.  
Investment – In order to boost investment and cooperation, the China-Africa 
Business Conference was held in parallel with the ministerial conference. 
Chinese companies made a contracted investment of US$1.25 billion to Africa 
and in 2003 were are involved with more than 300 projects covering 
construction, pharmaceutical, chemical, light industry and textiles.150 Trade 
promotion centres for investment were set up by the Chinese government in 11 
African countries. Special funds and preferential discount loans were offered 
to encourage and support Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa. 
Tourism Cooperation - To boost economic development, China-Africa 
tourism was enhanced by granting Approved Destination Status (ADS) to 
Chinese tourists to Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
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Seychelles, Tunisia, Zambia, Egypt, Morocco and South Africa. During 2005, 
Chinese tourists to Africa had doubled to more than 110 000.151 
Debt relief – A debt from 31 of the poorest African countries, totalling 
US$1.27 billion was cancelled. 
Development Assistance – China agreed to economically assist African states 
without attaching any political conditions.  
Natural resource and energy development – Africa was identified as a key 
supplier to the Chinese market. Cooperation in natural resources exploration 
and energy development would have to be expanded. 
 
Finally, in the last field, that of social development, China pledged to increase its 
African Human Resources Development Fund for the training of 10 000 African 
personnel in fields such as human resources, science and technology. Educational 
cooperation would be increased through teacher exchanges and new scholarships. 
China annually offered 1500 scholarships to African students to go study in China. 
China promised to enhance its cooperation in medical care and public health to help 
fight diseases such as Malaria, Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis, Ebola and Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS). Lastly, China would cooperate in cultural exchanges and people-
to-people exchanges. Overall, the Action Plan which emerged from the Addis Ababa 
conference was carried out efficiently and effectively by both China and the African 
states and served to broaden and deepen China-Africa relations in a diverse array of 
fields.  
 
4.5. The African Year 
 
The year 2006 marked the 50th anniversary of China-Africa relations and to mark this 
momentous occasion China released for the first time a Chinese policy paper on 
Africa. Chinese high-level official engagement in Africa was unprecedented and once 
the third CACF from 3-5 November 2006 had closed in Beijing, China’s pledge to 
forge “a new type of strategic partnership” with its fellow-African states had been 
warmly embraced.  
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4.5.1. China’s African Policy  
 
The China Government’s Official African Policy was released in January 2006. The 
document was published in order to calm the West’s (especially the US) growing 
unease of China’s rigorous competition in Africa.152 It stated: “China will 
unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding 
from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and the African peoples, establish 
and develop a new type of partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and 
mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange.”153 The document 
(see appendix number 1) is based mostly on previous Chinese policy objectives and 
published policy papers, such as China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the 
Beijing Declaration (October 2000), the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in 
Economic and Social Development (October 2000), and the Addis Ababa Action Plan 
(December 2003). The policy paper did not provide any significant changes and 
called for enhanced all-round cooperation between China and Africa in the fields of 
politics, economics, education, science, culture, health, social, peace and security. 
However, to increase understanding and friendship, new emphasis was placed on 
cooperation between political parties and local governments. Under the peace and 
security section, China proposed some new options for expanded cooperation, such as 
law enforcement agency exchanges and information sharing which did not appear in 
any previous official China-Africa policy documents.154 China’s basic policy and 
approach to its Africa relations thus remains basically unchanged.    
 
4.5.2. High-level Visits 
 
The extent to which Africa has now become a focus of China was indicated by the 
number of high-level visits from China to Africa as 2006. In January Li Zhaoxing, 
China’s foreign minister, swept through West Africa – Cape Verde, Liberia, Mali, 
Senegal, Nigeria and Libya, President Hu Jintao visited Nigeria, Morocco and Kenya 
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in April, and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited seven African countries in June – 
Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Angola.155  
 
These visits served to further advance China-Africa interaction and solidarity. In his 
speech to the Nigerian National Assembly, Hu said “To enlarge the scope of China-
Africa cooperation and diversify ways of conducting such cooperation and enable 
both sides to draw on their competitive strengths is in our mutual interests”.156 Hu 
also reiterated China’s longstanding policy of non-interference in other countries 
internal affairs. This was Hu’s second visit to the continent in as many years. A series 
of agreements focussing on technological and economic cooperation were signed after 
each visit, not to mention agreements which consolidated China’s access to oil 
reserves and other key raw materials. “We are ready to work with African nations… 
to reinforce cooperation in various fields, namely that of energy exploration”, said Li 
in Nigeria. On 9 January 2006, just two days before the start of his African tour, the 
Chinese state-controlled energy company China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) Ltd. announced that it would buy a 45% stake in a substantial off-shore oil 
field in Nigeria at the cost of US$2.3 billion.157 To quell increasing criticism about 
China’s interests in Africa being linked exclusively to energy exploitation, Assistant 
Foreign Minister He Yafei expressed that the Premier Wen’s last visit was not just 
about oil. He said “Some people think energy, the import of oil, is China’s sole 
purpose in developing economic ties with Africa. This view is erroneous and one 
sided. China and Africa have very comprehensive economic and trade cooperation. 
We’ve even adopted some measures to help African nations, including subsidies for 
imports. That reflects China’s sincerity.”158 
 
4.5.3. China-Africa Cooperation Forum 2006 
                                                 
155 From 31 December 2006-8 January 2007, Foreign Affairs Minister, Li Xhaoxing, visited another 
seven African countries – Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Central African Republic, 
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10 February 2007. He visited: Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, 
Mozambique and the Seychelles. Once again after each visit and with each country agreements on 
technological and economic cooperation were signed.  
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28 April 2006, p.2 
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 China’s relationship with African states has grown in leaps and bounds since the first 
CACF in 2000. The summit, held from 3-5 November 2006 in Beijing, marked the 
biggest-ever gathering between Chinese and African leaders. All 48 countries that 
have diplomatic relations with China took part and over 40 heads of state attended. 
This marked increase from only the four heads of state present at the first summit, 
indicates the increasing importance that African governments themselves place on 
China-Africa relations. “Building strong ties between China and Africa will not only 
promote development on each side, but also help cement unity and cooperation 
among developing countries and contribute to establishing a just and equitable new 
international political and international order”, said President Hu Jintao at the 
Forum’s Opening Ceremony.  
 
To build on several years of growing exchanges between China and Africa, the 
summit approved a three-year action plan to forge a “new type of strategic 
partnership” based on pragmatic cooperation, equality and mutual benefit. China 
pledged the following:159 
 
• Double aid to Africa by 2009 
• Set up a US$5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage 
Chinese companies to invest in Africa 
• Provide US$3 billion in preferential loans and US$2 billion in preferential 
buyer’s credits to African countries 
• Cancel all debt stemming from Chinese interest-free government loans that 
matured by the end of 2005, for the 31 highly indebted and least developed 
countries (LDCs) in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China  
• Further open up China’s market to exports from Africa’s LDCs by 
increasing from 190 to 440 the number of products receiving zero-tariff 
treatment 
• Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa 
• Build a conference centre for the AU to support African countries efforts 
                                                 
159 Chinese Government., “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009”, 16 
November 2006, http://za.chinaembassy.org/eng/zfgx/zfhzlt/t281763.htm  
 67
in integration and strengthening themselves 
• Train 15 000 African professionals, double the number, to 4000, of 
Chinese government scholarships given annually to African students and 
send 100 senior agricultural experts and 300 youth volunteers to Africa 
• Build 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centres and 100 rural schools 
 
If the most recent forum is anything to go by, China-Africa relations will continue to 
grow from strength to strength. 
  
4.6. Aid and Debt Reduction 
 
China’s economic engagement in Africa is advanced by technical aid and debt 
forgiveness as techniques for building influence on the continent. During the opening 
ceremony of the Addis Ababa CACF, Premier Wen thanked African countries for 
their support and stated that despite China’s economic volume being one of the largest 
in the world, in per capita terms it was still low. He went on to describe China as a big 
country with uneven development and a relatively low productivity level, which made 
the goal of modernisation a long way off. He stated “against such a background, the 
assistance China can provide African countries is limited. However we do offer our 
assistance with the deepest sincerity and without any political conditions… we will 
never forget the invaluable support China has received from African countries over 
the years in our endeavours to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.”160 Wen’s opening statement emphasises two points firstly, despite its 
economic growth, China is still a developing country and can thus relate to 
developing African countries. Secondly, China is willing to unselfishly help its fellow 
African states for no political gain. This could be reflected by the fact that in 2002 
about 44% of China’s widespread assistance, a total of US$1.8 billion, to developing 
countries came to Africa.161 However, despite this sentiment Chinese aid to Africa 
appears to be very closely linked to China’s strategic and political objectives and can 
thus be grouped into six categories: 1) Financial assistance, 2) Limited debt relief, 3) 
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Training programmes, 4) Technical Assistance, 5) Tariff exemption, and 6) Peace-
keeping activities in Africa. Let’s look at these categories in a little more detail.   
 
In the first category, financial assistance has been provided for key investments and is 
perhaps the oldest form of Chinese aid to Africa. China offers to fund infrastructure 
projects, which the World Bank and other bilateral funders stopped funding decades 
ago.  From 1956 to 2005, the Chinese government had provided aid to about 887 
projects in Africa (see Table 4.1). These projects covered a broad range of sectors 
such as agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery, textile, energy, infrastructure, water 
conservancy, and power generation. The agricultural, fishery and animal husbandry 
projects will become essential in helping to feed China’s population in the future, 
especially once China is no longer able to produce enough food domestically. 
However, much of this has been covered in previous chapters. Infrastructural projects 
linked to the institutional interests of the recipient state are especially popular in 
Africa and particularly favoured by China for a number of reasons. Firstly, they form 
a significant part of what Alden refers to as “symbolic diplomacy” which is basically 
the promotion of national representation abroad.162 From the Chinese perspective, 
these projects demonstrate China’s influence as a rising world power; while at the 
same time spoil Taiwan’s efforts to gain a diplomatic grip on the continent. Secondly, 
China has a crucial understanding of the way governments work in impoverished 
countries. For example, sports stadiums or new government buildings provide the 
ruling elite with concrete signs of power that can feed their need for legitimacy or win 
support from the population.163 
 
Table 4.1:  Assistance in Africa164 
Country Chinese Assistance and Projects 
Angola Debt relief, US$2 billion loan 
Benin Stadium, government office building, conference centre, hospital 
Burkina Faso* - 
Burundi Textile mill, hydroelectric power station, highway  
                                                 
162 Alden, C., “China and Africa: A New Strategic Alliance” in Enter the Dragon, Le Pere, G., and 
Draper, P., (eds), Institute for Global Dialogue: Braamfontein, 2006, p.20 
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Cameroon Conference building, hydroelectric power station, hospitals 
Cape Verde Government office building, conference hall 
Chad * - 
Central African 
Republic  
Agricultural technological station, radio station, training centre, clinics 
Republic of Congo Stadium, hydroelectric power station, broadcasting station, hospital, factory 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo 
Stadium, trade centre, people’s palace, factories 
Comoros Government office building, water supply project, people’s palace 
Djibouti Stadium, government office building, people’s palace, housing project 
Equatorial Guinea Hydroelectric power station, radio station, highways 
Eritrea Humanitarian assistance, hospital 
Ethiopia Highway, veterinary centre, power station, water supply project 
Gabon Healthcare centre, primary school, assembly building 
Gambia* Stadium, hostel, health centres 
Ghana National theatre, irrigation project, vocational training centre, hospital 
Guinea People’s palace, hydroelectric power station, cinema, presidential palace 
Guinea Bissau Housing project, power-generating equipment, technical cooperation 
Ivory Coast Theatre, water conservation project 
Lesotho Vegetable planting, convention centre, industrial park 
Liberia Sugar mill, rice project, sports stadium, hospital renovation, office building 
Malawi* - 
Mali Stadium, conference centre, textile mill, sugar refinery, leather-processing 
factory, pharmacy 
Mauritius Stadium, bridges, airport terminal building 
Mozambique Textile mill, passenger cargo vessel, water supply project, shoe factory, 
parliament building, housing project 
Namibia Water supply project, civil housing project 
Niger Stadium, water supply project, textile mills, housing project 
Nigeria Railway upgrade 
Rwanda Highways, cement factory, veterinary school 
Sao Tome and 
Principe* 
- 
Senegal Stadium, water conservation project 
Seychelles Swimming pool, housing projects, schools 
Sierra Leone Road bridges, stadium, sugar complex, office building, hydroelectric power 
station, civil housing 
Somalia Medical teams, medicines, disaster relief materials 
South Africa** - 
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Sudan** - 
Swaziland* - 
Tanzania Tan-Zam railway, textile mill, rice project, sugar factory, coal mine 
Togo Conference centre, sugar refinery, stadium, hospital, irrigation project 
Uganda Rice projects, stadium, factories 
Zambia Tan-Zam railway, roads, factories, textile mill, water supply project 
Zimbabwe Stadium, hospitals, dams, factories 
*These countries have diplomatic ties with Taiwan 
**The amount of total aid is unknown 
 
Under the second category, that of debt cancellation, Premier Wen announced the 
debt cancellation of US$1.27 billion to 31 African countries at the Addis Ababa 
CACF in 2003. This issue was first placed on the agenda by South Africa at the 
previous CACF in 2000. Although the request alarmed the Chinese officials at the 
time, the decision to finally cancel the debt did have two important lasting effects. 
Firstly, at the symbolic level, China responded to a key African issue which had been 
pushed by many an African head of state. Secondly, by cancelling the debt, China put 
itself in the same league as other foreign powers with Africa relations, by implicitly 
suggesting that its interests and concerns in Africa are similar to those of the West and 
that its taking steps to counter these concerns.165 China’s debt forgiveness earns it 
considerable political capital among the Africa states which ensures, amongst other 
things, their support at the UN and other multilateral forums. Building on Wen’s 2003 
announcement, at the CACF China announced that it would cancel all debt stemming 
from Chinese interest-free government loans that matured by the end of 2005 for 31 
highly indebted LDCs in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China. This 
amount is estimated at around US$1.4 billion.166  
 
The third category covers the growing number of training programmes and education 
initiatives, which enhance understanding on both sides and lays the foundation for 
achieving sustainable social and economic development. Under the follow up actions 
of the CACF, China’s African Human Resources Development Fund had provided 
training for 15 000 Africans in China, and pledged to train another 15 000 by the end 
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of 2009. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government will double the scholarships 
offered to African students from 2000 to 4000. The students usually spend two years 
learning Chinese, after which they begin studies in technical projects, particularly 
engineering disciplines.167 Rural schools will be built and annual teacher training will 
be encouraged. This support for education improves China’s image in many countries, 
builds grassroots support in local communities and a better understanding of China 
among the educated elite. 
 
The fourth category looks at technical assistance. China’s technical aid has been 
particularly successful in building China’s influence in the region. Medical, 
agricultural and engineering teams have provided technical aid to Africa since the 
1950s. More than 15 000 doctors have worked in Africa since 1963 cumulatively 
treating 180 million cases of HIV/AIDS.168 At the end of 2004 about 1 100 Chinese 
doctors were working on the continent. Technical support which has a chance at 
providing monetary returns is obviously favoured by China, as financial aid stretches 
resources and diverts money from important domestic requirements.  
 
The fifth category is that of tariff exemption. This is a new initiative which was first 
introduced at the Addis Ababa Forum where China instituted a programme of tariff 
exemption for 25 African economies covering 190 products including, general 
machinery, mining and smelting machinery, electronic devices, food, textiles and 
machinery.  The number of export items from Africa to China was increased to 440 at 
the 2006 Forum.  
 
The last category looks at China’s peacekeeping activities in Africa. This is a very 
recent activity for China. There are currently about 1 500 troops currently deployed 
on seven missions in Africa, for example Liberia, Sudan and the Republic of 
Congo.169 China’s peacekeeping contingents are usually involved in the engineering, 
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transport and medical fields where the rehabilitate roads and treat thousands of 
patients. The UN has praised them for their excellence in the field.170  
 
Thus from the discussion above we a re able to see that China’s various aid initiatives 
have helped African people at all levels of society. Infrastructure projects for the 
general population, tariff exemption for business people, debt cancellation for 
government and at the grassroots level, technical assistance and peacekeeping 
activities. All initiatives have helped to bolster China’s international image within 
African states. 
 
4.7. Africa’s natural resources fuel China’s successful economic reform policies 
 
It is important to cover China’s need for resources as a steady and constant supply is 
vital for China’s national security. China succeeds in gaining lucrative trade deals 
come with strong incentives such as aid, especially in the area of infrastructure. Aid 
deals especially in the field of infrastructure help cushion China’s efforts to succeed 
in gaining lucrative trade deals. China currently has the fastest growing economy in 
the world. For the past decade, it has sustained an annual growth rate at around 9% 
and its foreign trade has increased fivefold. From 1990 to 2003, China’s share of 
global exports rose from 1.8% to 34% and its share of global imports rose from 1.5% 
to 40%.171 China’s domestic petroleum production has declined and its coal output is 
insufficient and as a result China needs all sorts of commodities to sustain its booming 
economy and provide for the demand from its generally wealthier society and their 
increasing need for consumer products such as fridges and cars. Amongst other things 
China needs timber, minerals and oil. We will look at each one in a little more detail 
further on. In 2003, China displaced the US and Europe as the biggest consumer of 
the most industrial raw goods and in 2004 China displaced Japan as the world’s 
second-largest consumer of petrol consumption, after the US. China’s demand for 
natural resources has led to rising commodity prices, especially copper, gold, 
aluminium, nickel and timber in Africa, which combined with higher production, have 
helped African economies to grow. For example, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased at an average of 4.4% in 2001-2004, compared 
with only 2.6% in the previous three years.172Africa’s economy grew 5.5% in 2005 
and is expected to do even better in the coming years.173According to the IMF, five of 
the world’s ten fastest growing economies are in Africa. African states have enjoyed 
the new trading opportunities offered by China and no longer depend primarily on the 
traditional markets of the US and Europe. 
 
 Besides their long history of friendship and solidarity, the African continent has 
become vital in helping feed China’s commodity hunger. Africa has 21% forest 
coverage and 27% grasslands. It accounts for 40% of the world’s water resources. 
Africa’s platinum, chrome and manganese account for 80% of the world’s total. The 
continent has 60% of the world’s diamonds and 50% of the world’s gold, phosphate, 
cobalt and palladium. Africa’s uranium, tantalum, caesium, zirconium and graphite 
account for 30% and copper 20% of the world total. And perhaps most importantly 
(for China) the known amount of oil is about 9.5% which is only second to the Middle 
East.174  A report published by Deutsche Bank Research, indicated that China would 
remain hungry for commodities over the coming 15 years. Crude oil and metal ores 
head the list of China’s top commodity imports and is the world’s leading importer of 
plastic materials, metal ores, oil seeds, textile fibres and, pulp and paper (See Table 
4.2).175 
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Table 4.2: China’s Top 10 Imports in 2004176 
Commodity Share in World Imports (%) Global Rank 
Crude petroleum 6.1 3 
Chemical elements and compounds 9.5 2 
Plastic materials 12.9 1 
Iron and steel 9.0 2 
Metal-ferrous ores and metal scrap 21.7 1 
Non-ferrous metals 8.5 3 
Oil seeds, oil nuts and nut kernels 27.8 1 
Textile fibres, not manufactured, and waste 23.9 1 
Chemical materials and products 6.0 4 
Pulp and paper 19.2 1 
 
4.7.1. Oil 
 
After many years of self-sufficiency, China had to start importing oil in 1993 – the 
amount of which is steadily increasing every year - from 6.4% of its total 
consumption in 1993, to 31% in 2002, and a projected 60% by 2020.177 Between 2000 
and 2004 China alone was responsible for the 40% increase in oil demand around the 
world.178 Currently, China accounts for 30% of global growth in oil demand, which is 
slightly higher than the 26% from the rest of the world (see Figure 4.1). In 2004 China 
was importing 5.56 million barrels of oil a day; it is projected to reach 12.8 million 
barrels by 2025.179 China’s future need for almost triple (130% increase) the amount 
of oil it requires today, will impact significantly on the world oil trends, especially the 
cost and the availability of oil. Like many industrialised and growing economies 
around the world, China is seeking to diversify its sources and ensure energy security 
in order to fulfil its oil requirements. It would therefore appear that China’s oil 
diplomacy has two main goals: in the short term, secure oil supplies to feed its 
growing domestic economy, and in the long term, to position China as a global player 
in the international oil market.180  
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Figure 4.1: China’s Crude Petroleum Imports (US$ Billion)181 
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China imports over one quarter of its oil from Africa. Oil coming from West Africa is 
particularly attractive for three key reasons: Firstly, the oil coming from this region is 
of a high quality, light, waxy and low sulphur content which is more-environmentally 
friendly and is easily processed by the Chinese oil refineries which are designed to 
process domestic oil of a similar grade.182 Secondly, a large proportion of the oilfields 
are found off offshore, this is advantageous for loading oil directly onto oil tankers 
which provides a relative stability in oil production levels. Thirdly, aside from Nigeria, 
West African producers do not belong to the Organisation of Petroleum Producing 
States (OPEC) and are not subject to the cartel’s production or exports restrictions.183 
Among the African oil-producing countries Angola, Sudan, Congo, Equatorial Guinea 
and Nigeria are its biggest suppliers. Angola is China’s biggest supplier and accounts 
for 50% of its oil imports from Africa (see Figure 4.2).184 
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Figure 4.2: Chinese Share of Crude Oil Imports from Africa (as a percent), by 
Country of Origin185 
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Angola – China is Angola’s second-biggest importer of oil, around 30%, after the US 
(40%).186 Half of China’s oil supply in Africa comes from Angola, making it China’s 
biggest oil supplier. In 2005, 14% of China’s oil came from Angola187, which means 
that Angola had overtaken Saudi Arabia as China’s biggest single provider of oil.188 
In 2004, state-owned company Sinopec bought into a British Petroleum (BP) operated 
offshore block, securing its entry with a US$2.25 billion loan.189 Where rebuilding the 
infrastructure is a top priority in the war-torn country, the terms of the loan agreement 
provided that the money would be used for reconstruction and development projects 
to build the country’s infrastructure. However, 70% of the construction projects were 
assigned to Chinese companies, leaving only 30% for domestic contractors. This has, 
of course, raised much criticism amongst the local businessmen who were hoping the 
loan would be used to provide more opportunities for Angolans. The deal also 
provided that Angola would supply 10 000 barrels of oil a day. In 2006 another US$2 
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billion in loans was provided by China, specifically for the reconstruction of transport 
infrastructure. It would use US$500 million to repair the rail network and 
US$1.5billion to upgrade other areas of Angola’s transport network, including 
rebuilding almost half of Angola’s 754 roads and highways.190 Angola is one of many 
examples in Africa which illustrates how China’s aid leads to preferential oil deals.  
 
Sudan – Sudan is the second biggest exporter of oil to China from Africa. China 
currently receives 7% of oil imports from Sudan and is the country’s second-biggest 
foreign investor. Sudan has benefited from the largest Chinese investments, which 
have helped to double Sudan’s proven reserves.191 China’s first big venture into 
Africa came in 1996 where state-owned CNPC took a 40% share, originally held by 
the US’s Chevron, as the largest shareholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company, which controls Sudan’s oil fields.192 Soon after China built an oil refinery 
in Khartoum and a 1500km long pipeline that runs from the oilfields to the port of 
Sudan.193 China has invested about US$4 billion Sudan. While the majority of 
investment goes into refinery, oil well and pipeline construction, a fair amount has 
also gone into other infrastructural projects such as the construction of electric 
substations and transmission lines, water systems (US$325 million) and finance for 
the Kajbar Dam project (US$345 million), which is a pipeline that will channel water 
from the Nile River to Port Sudan.194 China later sent 4000 troops to protect the oil 
pipeline from banditry and pilfering once it had been built.195 At one point 10 000 
Chinese workers were employed to help complete projects in Sudan. China started its 
investments in Sudan at a time when Western companies were pulling out or putting 
investment on hold, due to the role oil revenue was having on fuelling the civil war in 
Southern Sudan. It is estimated that as much as 80% of revenue generated by Sudan’s 
oil fields has been invested in the war. China is also Sudan’s biggest arms supplier. 
Until 2004 China continuously used its position at the UN to dilute repeated 
resolutions on the crisis, preventing any threat of sanctions on the Sudanese 
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government. International criticism on the way in which China has dealt with Sudan is 
perhaps taking its toll and making China think twice before it veto. In March 2005, 
China abstained from voting on a Security Council resolution that referred the 
possible war crimes and charges of genocide in Sudan to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).196 Thus in the case of Sudan, China is in a profitable partnership that 
brings in billions of dollars in investment, oil revenue, weapons and diplomatic 
protection, to a government accused by the West of genocide in Darfur and human 
rights abuses of people being chased off ancestral land in order to be cleared for oil 
production.197 
 
Equatorial Guinea - US companies dominate the surging oil business in Equatorial 
Guinea. The US is Equatorial Guinea’s main export partner and US companies 
account for the biggest bilateral investors in the country, estimated at about US$11 
billion. However Chinese influence is one the rise. Exports to China from Equatorial 
Guinea rose by 138%, from 2003 to 2004.198 China is said to be providing military 
training and specialists to the dictatorship in the hope of gaining oil concessions.199 
After President Teodoro Obiang returned from a trip to China in October 2005, he 
came back and announced “China is the main partner with whom we are going to 
develop Equatorial Guinea”.200 Several months later, CNOOC announced that it had 
been awarded a contract for share-production in one of Equatorial Guinea’s offshore 
blocks. The case of Equatorial Guinea reflects where China and the US are in direct 
competition for access to Equatorial Guinea’s energy and where the US has had to 
tone down on its policy engagement on human rights and good governance.  
 
Nigeria - Nigeria is Africa’s biggest oil producer and the fifth biggest African 
exporter of oil to China. In July 2005, PetroChina concluded a US$800 million deal 
with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to purchase 30 000 barrels of oil a 
day for five years.201 In January 2006, CNOOC purchased a 45 % stake in a Nigerian 
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offshore oil and gas field for US$2.27 billion and promised to invest an additional 
US$2.25 billion in field development, particularly to repair old rail lines and supply 
new rolling stock and equipment.202 Future deals in Nigeria have also been sweetened 
by additional incentives from the Chinese who are considering US$7 billion 
investments in Nigeria, covering a wide variety of sectors, including agriculture and 
selling fighter jets and patrol boats to Nigeria.203 The oil blocs that China is bidding 
for are in the disputed area of the Niger Delta, where insurgency, banditry and the 
stealing of oil are rife. The Niger Delta is an area where the West is unwilling to 
invest, however China will benefit by retaining a considerable foothold in the energy 
sector – even if considerable amounts of money are lost until it is able to secure its 
investments. The case of Nigeria is a good illustration of China’s long-term strategy 
by way of getting a foot in the door so to speak, in order to gain greater benefits down 
the road. 
 
China has also signed deals to purchase oil, develop oilfields, construct oil refineries, 
explore offshore oil fields and obtain drilling licenses in numerous other African 
states. These include Algeria, Gabon, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Mauritania, 
Namibia and Ethiopia. China accompanies its search for more oil with investments, 
infrastructure projects, arms sales, or aid.  
 
4.7.2 Minerals 
 
China has also been pursuing an active policy in mineral-rich countries. It is now the 
biggest consumer of copper in the world. In Zambia, China has invested about 
US$170 million in the mining sector, mostly in the copper sector.204 In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) China has invested in cobalt and copper mines, 
it is also working on infrastructure projects like roads to facilitate its mineral exports. 
In diamond and mineral rich Sierra Leone, China has restored a luxury hotel and in 
2005 announced that it would be investing US$200 million for an ocean-front tourism 
complex.205 In Liberia, the Chinese government announced in May 2006 that it would 
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cancel US$10 million in overdue debt incurred since 2004. It has invested in 
infrastructure, provided farming equipment, and provided Liberia duty-free access to 
its markets. In return China has been sold iron ore at below market rates, without 
following transparency procedures. China tried to stop a UN Panel of Experts on 
Liberia from drawing attention to this issue.206  
 
4.7.3 Timber 
 
China is the biggest importer of forest products in the world (refer Table5.2), and its 
imports of forest products have tripled in less than a decade. The primary reason is 
due to government placing a widespread ban on logging in large parts of China 
because of bad logging practices and excessive deforestation which resulted in the 
flooding of the Yangtze River in 1998 that killed 4000 people and resulted in billions 
of dollars of destruction. Until this time the demand for timber had been met by 
domestic suppliers.207 China is now importing its wood from the forests in Cameroon, 
Mozambique, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia. Many of China’s 
imports from Africa are from unlicensed loggers or from companies with 
environmentally unsound logging practices. Illegal logging is destroying Africa’s 
forests and depriving governments of badly needed revenue. Illegal timber exports are 
as high as 70% in Gabon and 90% in Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia.208   
 
4.8. Trade  
 
As mentioned earlier, trade deals in Africa are enhanced by Chinese aid and thus 
build influence on the continent. The Chinese government has invested heavily in 
Africa since the establishment of the CACF in 2000, and as a result bilateral trade 
between China and Africa is increasing dramatically each year. Through the CACF 
China has encouraged trade and investments relations and provided opportunities for 
governments and businesses to strengthen economic cooperation. After the 
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establishment of the CACF trade between China and Africa had quintupled from US$ 
10.6 billion in 2000 to US$5.5 billion by the end of 2006 (see Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3: China-Africa Trade in US$ billion209 
Year Amount Year Amount 
1999 5.6 2003 18.48 
2000 10.6 2004 29.46 
2001 10.7 2005 39.75 
2002 12.39 2006 55.5 
 
 
As a result, the share of China in Africa’s trade has also increased. For example, 
African exports to China was less than half a percent in 1990, by 2000 the figure had 
risen to roughly 2.5% and by 2004, African exports to China was sitting at 6% (see 
Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3: Share of China in Africa’s Trade as a percent210 
0
2
4
6
8
1990 1995 2000 2004
Exports to China
Imports from China
 
 
Africa’s current trade links with China are relatively small in relation to its trade with 
the rest of the world. Although Africa’s trade with the US has also increased, more 
than doubling from US$29 billion to US$58 billion in 2004, African trade with China 
is growing at a much faster rate, at an average of more than 50% per year since 
2002.211 Europe’s trade with Africa has decreased over the last decade but it is still 
Africa’s biggest trade partner. In 2005, Europe constituted 32% of Africa’s total trade. 
China’s share of trade with Africa is growing the fastest and reached 10% in 2005 and 
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is expected to double by 2010212 (refer Figure 4.4). At the same time, it should be 
kept in mind that China’s trade with the rest of the world has also expanded so 
China’s trade with Africa accounts for only 2.3% of China’s total trade.213 It is likely 
that the dramatic rise in China-Africa trade will have a substantial impact on the 
continent. Already the redirection of exports has been dramatic for some countries. 
For example, 70% of Sudan’s exports go to China, whereas in 1990 it was only 10%; 
Burkina Faso sends about a third of all its exports (mostly cotton) to China, compared
to basically nothing in the 1990s; and now China is Angola’s second biggest export 
market afte
 
r the US.214 
 
Figure 4.4: Africa’s trade with China, EU and the US as a % of trade215 
 
 
Trade between China and Africa is further encouraged by business conferences, trade 
exhibits and promotion fairs. The second China-Africa business conference was held 
direclty after the last CACF in November 2006. At the summit Premier Wen 
anounced that China hoped to increase trade between the two regions to US$ 100 
billion by 2010. Hundreds of African business people attended and trade and 
investments agreements worth US$1.9 billion were announced between 12 Chinese 
companies and 11 African nations. The areas covered included telecoms, technology, 
mineral resource development, insurance and specifically included a US$ 300 million 
new aliminium production plant in Egypt, a US$300 million contract to upgrade a 
highway in Nigeria, and a US$200 million copper project in Zambia.216 Furthermore, 
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Sinopec will start preliminary explorations for oil in Liberia, and Sino Hydro 
Corporation started negotiations to build a hydroelectric dam in electricity-short 
Ghana.217 When looking at China’s African trade partners, nine out of the top ten are 
all oil-producing states (see Table 4.4). South Africa, the only non-oil producing state 
from China’s top ten trade partners is a well developed industrialised economy. It is 
China’s second biggest trade partner and an almost exclusive supplier of ore and 
diamonds to China.218 It is interesting to note that Chad, an emerging oil producer, is 
also on the list, especially considering that its one of the few countries in Africa to 
recognise Taiwan. Perhaps most interesting though is China’s tenth biggest trade 
partner, Chad, one of the few countries in Africa to recognise Taiwan. Perhaps, 
China’s strong insistance to adhere to the one-China policy can be bent when national 
interest is at stake. (A detailed analysis of the China-Taiwan issue and its impact on 
Africa will be looked at in the following chapter.) 
 
Table 4.4: China’s top ten African trade partners in 2004219 
Country % of Sino-African Trade 
Angola 27.4 
South Africa 20.6 
Sudan 13.4 
Republic of Congo 9.8 
Equatorial Guinea 6.3 
Gabon 3.3 
Nigeria 3.0 
Algeria 1.7 
Morocco 1.7 
Chad 1.2 
Total 88.4 
 
Some critics in the West and in Africa have complained that China’s appraoch to 
Africa is neo-colonialist because it focuses on extracting natural reosurces and raw 
materials from Africa and selling manufactured goods back for instance when looking 
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at China’s trade with Africa. Oil and natural gas is the single most important 
commodity exported from Africa at 62%, followed by ores and metals at 17% and 
agricultural raw materials at 7% of total exports, while Africa’s biggest imports from 
China are textiles, apparel and footwear (36%) and machinery and transport 
equipment at 33% (see Figure 4.5). Furthermore, it is argued that the increased 
commodity prices in African states will benefit the elite only, and not the population 
at large. 
  
Figure 4.5: Product Distribution of Africa’s Trade with China220 
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China’s growing global drive to gain access to overseas markets for Chinese 
manufactured goods has been successful in Africa. Even though the African market 
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(around 800 million people) is relatively small for consumer goods, China has found a 
ready market for its cheap, low-quality consumer products. China is focusing its 
exports (mostly household utensils, mechanical and electrical products, textiles and 
clothes) on countries with large populations and relatively high purchasing power. As 
a result South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria account for 58% of 
African imports from China.221  Chinese companies have opened up manufacturing 
operations aimed at regional markets or even export markets in the US and the EU 
and exploit the duty-free access granted to products from poorer African countries.222 
This has had an adverse effect on African textile manufactures and recently China’s 
textile exports have begun to weaken local African production which is unable to 
compete with merchandise made in China. For example, in 2005 more than ten 
clothing factories closed in Lesotho, and South African exports to the US dropped 
from US$26 million in the first quarter of 2004 to US$12 million in 2005.223        
 
4.9. Investment 
 
There are currently roughly 700 Chinese companies operating in 49 states in Africa 
and by the end of 2005 China had invested US$6.27 billion on the continent.224 By 
the end of 2006 China had signed investment protection agreements with 28 Afric
states, and agreements on avoidance of double taxation with 8 African states. China 
has found it difficult to establish markets where it must compete directly with large 
Western multinational corporations (MNCs) and as a result prefers to invest in less 
competitive areas, usually in countries where sanctions, unreliable political situations 
or other potential liabilities have prevented Western companies from investing.
an 
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The extent to which Chinese energy companies have become involved in Africa has 
been adequately discussed in section o 4.7.1 of this chapter. For now, it is sufficed to 
say that Chinese energy companies have become increasingly prominent in Africa and 
as long as China’s economy continues to boom, they will continue to do so.  
 
Chinese firms have also become increasingly important in the construction sector. 
Many of the firms are also state-owned and build things like stadiums, roads, 
presidential palaces, dams, railways and government buildings. Most of the 
construction projects are aid-related and built under terms of gift-aid or concessional 
loans. Chinese firms have a reputation for providing good quality projects and at a 
discount price of 25-50% of other foreign investors. China is able to keep its costs so 
low for a number of reasons:227 
 
• Largely because most of the companies are state-owned they are 
subsidised by the government and are therefore able to work for lower 
profit margins than Western companies which work to maximise short-
term profits 
• Chinese investors have access to much cheaper capital than local investors 
• The almost exclusive employment of low-paid Chinese staff, often living 
in standards lower than the local population in secluded barracks 
• The use of Chinese materials, with very little local sourcing 
• Very little attention to environmental impact 
 
Despite not making short term profits, the Chinese investments will yield significant 
returns in the long run. As most infrastructure projects are public sector works, China 
considers these investments as goodwill projects to charm African state leaders, which 
in return gains China political influence, that then opens doors to commercially or 
strategically more attractive businesses in other sectors.228  
 
10. Mutual Benefit 
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There have been different reactions to China’s engagement with Africa. The elite 
have praised China’s model of modernisation and claimed it to be better suited to 
Africa’s needs. Also its policy of “no strings attached” is welcomed. Amongst the 
general population, reactions are varied. Local consumers are happy with the cheap 
consumer products supplied by the Chinese, trade unions are concerned about the loss 
of jobs and businessmen claim that all Chinese capital goes to Chinese businessmen 
already in Africa. Lastly, NGOs claim that China’s involvement undermines 
environmental, labour and human rights standards on the continent. Despite talk of 
China’s rising influence in Africa as a threat, China denies this and affirms that its 
relations with Africa are to benefit both regions. Thus, mutual benefit comes in many 
forms: 
 
Infrastructure Projects - Most obviously perhaps, Africa’s inconvenient and costly 
transport has been a big factor leading to Africa’s marginalisation in global trade and 
investment. China’s strong support and heavy interest in infrastructural projects on the 
continent has helped to make the extraction and transportation of its natural resources 
more accessible, while at the same time ensuring that China gets what it needs to feed 
its own domestic economy. 
 
Economic lifeline for “pariah states” – Pariah states, especially oil-producing states 
(such as Sudan), which have been cut-off politically and economically from the rest of 
the world for bad governance or human rights abuses, benefit from Chinese trade and 
investment in their state. While pariah states, have found a reliable economic partner 
in China that does not question their domestic political policies. China has been able 
to diversify its oil resources and become less dependent on other oil producing 
countries. 
 
Diplomatic protection - China can use its position on the UNSC to look after its 
(economic) interests, especially where those interests interfere with its interests in 
African states. Specifically Sudan, which has been accused by the West of committing 
genocide in the Darfur region, has avoided serious sanctions because of China’s veto 
power. China has also blocked efforts by the UN to investigate and punish President 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe for a “clean-up campaign” in 2005, where police destroyed 
slums and markets and as a result deprived 700 000 Zimbabweans of homes and 
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jobs.229 In return the Chinese government has retained access to its lucrative 
investments in each country (Coal and iron ore in Zimbabwe and oil in Sudan).  
 
4.11. Challenges and Obstacles 
 
With China’s rising influence in Africa there are a number of challenges and obstacles 
both regions will have to overcome if African states want to ensure sustainable 
growth and China wants to avoid the perception that its engagement with Africa is 
self-serving. The first challenge relates to the fact that natural resources are finite. 
African states which do no diversify their economic base will, once those resources 
have been exhausted, become dependent on aid flows (once more) and become 
marginalised within the global economy (once more). Therefore African states need to 
adopt mechanisms which will encourage the better management of natural resources 
and make them more sustainable.230 As a Nigerian columnist observed “unless steps 
are taken to alter this pattern of trade, the relationship in the future will come to 
resemble the Europe/America and Africa relations, that is, lopsided, dependent and 
even detrimental to Africa”.231Secondly, China’s environmental impact. China should 
ensure that greater environmental sensitivity is adopted when making deals in Africa. 
While the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states serves 
China well to gain access to commodities, as China’s power increases it will need to 
become more internationally responsible. Thirdly, the issue of Chinese competiveness 
in marginal small economies has resulted in African states being undercut by Chinese 
manufacturers, especially in the textile market. African states have fallen into a false 
sense of security by the China-fuelled commodity boom, and in return accommodated 
modes of economic engagement dictated by Chinese investors.232  
 
The lack of infrastructure in Africa is a major constraint to Africa when exporting its 
commodities. Although there are many Chinese projects in Africa working on 
infrastructure-related projects. These projects all serve to accommodate China’s 
interest in the region. African states should therefore work toward integrating Chinese 
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assistance into their own broader development strategies.233  Fifth, China’s massive 
transfer of personnel does not have a positive impact on African job markets, the 
building of local capacities and the transfer of technologies.234 Xenophobia is 
growing against migrants from China.235 Lastly, increasing criticism from the W
over human rights is another obstacle China and Africa will have to overcome. China
has been accused of ignoring human rights abuses in Sudan and Zimbabwe and t
economic engagement China has with these countries have helped to support the 
(mal-)practices of these governments. For example, Zimbabwe is currently in 
negotiations with China over a US$2 billion loan to help prop up its collapsing 
economy under the burden of 1000% inflation. Western governments and 
international financial institutions have cut off all support to Mugabe’s regime.
est 
 
he 
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4.12. Implications of Chinese Aid policies for future Sino-Africa relations 
  
China’s engagement with Africa has been greeted with enthusiasm across the 
continent and its aid has been welcomed with open arms. Chinese aid has been 
praised across the continent for having brought concrete benefits to Africa and its 
people. Chinese aid has helped China secure diplomatic relations within Africa. Since 
1956 China has helped African countries build over 700 projects in the fields of 
agriculture, fishery, light and textile industry, energy, transportation, hydropower, 
education and communication.237 Chinese-aided infrastructural projects have been 
essential in helping African countries become part of the global playing field. The 
construction of road and rail networks across the continent have been essential in 
helping to transport the extraction of raw materials to ports and thus the rest of the 
world. This has led to greater freedom amongst African states to control their own 
affairs and decrease their reliance on Western aid and the conditions that accompany 
it. China’s willingness to do business anywhere and go into countries that are deemed 
to risky by its Western counterparts, earns it great leverage over the recipient country 
to negotiate further strategic trade and investment deals.   
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 However, China’s aid has not had a significant impact on the socio-economic sector 
of the recipient state.238 In fact, much of China’s aid and assistance is tied, as Tull 
argues, and pays out by way of Africa’s support of the one-China policy, diplomatic 
support, especially at the UN, ensures favourable trade deals and much to the 
consternation of the West, it helps to support the political economies of narrow state 
elite. However, judging from its increasing influence in the region, China’s elite-
centred methods of assistance have proven to be extremely effective. China’s 
assistance has helped to cultivate goodwill among the African elite who reciprocate 
with diplomatic support and favourable aid deals, thus making the state elites, rather 
than the ordinary African citizens, the economic and political winners from China’s 
involvement in Africa.239 In other words China’s aid is being used to subsidise 
squandering governments who fail to advance the notions of democracy and socio-
economic reforms for the greater good of their population, some may say then, that 
Chinese aid does not meet its altruistic aims. However, as China has often claimed, its 
assistance comes with no political strings and that what happens within the borders of 
one’s own country is a domestic affair, thus with policies like this China is sure to 
maintain access to Africa’s markets and resources. 
 
With China’s self-declared support for African organisations like the AU and NEPAD 
this could spell trouble. For instance, one of the objectives of the NEPAD is to 
promote corruption-free and good governance in Africa, for its own sake and to 
secure sustained developmental aid from rich G8 countries (which despite China’s 
increased aid policies in Africa, still provide the majority of aid to Africa), thus aid 
which fails to advance these objectives is counterproductive.240 Chinese aid can 
reduce the independence of the recipient African state and “make it a hostage to 
Chinese foreign policy” which can result in detrimental consequences, such as the 
plight of the textile industry in South Africa and Lesotho.241 China has also been 
criticised by the West for the way in which it offers billions of dollars of 
unconditional aid and cheap loans to Africa. It is argued that these procedures risk 
driving African countries that have only just recovered from debt relief, back into debt 
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and thus undermine efforts to create democratic and accountable administrations.242 It 
would appear though, that by insisting that an ethical field of human rights, corruption 
and good governance which economic relations should be respected at all times,  is a 
mechanism employed by those states and institutions to counter their growing 
economic competition with China in Africa.243 
 
4.13. Conclusion 
 
It is hoped that this chapter was able to illustrate how China’s engagement in Africa 
has become almost exclusively commercially based. China’s commercial success has 
been significantly helped by the various aid packages China uses to close its trade and 
investment deals. As a developing country that has a booming economy, China has 
served as an inspiration to many African states. By establishing the CACF, China was 
able to take the first step in creating long-lasting and concrete relations with Africa. 
 
China’s need to feed its growing economy led it to look for diversified sources of raw 
materials. Africa, a resource-rich continent, together with its strong historical ties with 
China was an obvious choice. The creation of the CACF was the first step which 
would ensure a strong and solid basis for Sino-Africa relations. The forum also 
highlighted that economic interaction was China’s primary purpose in Africa and that 
south-south interaction would only be secondary. The Addis Ababa forum in 2003 
highlighted an impressive list of follow-up actions that China had carried out in 
diverse fields; however China had been the most active in the field of economic 
development. Trade had grown 400%, investment was booming but perhaps what 
impressed African leaders the most was China’s announcement to cancel US$1.27 
billion, 
 
The year 2006 heralded as the “African year” by the Chinese, marked the 50th 
anniversary of China-Africa relations and coincided with the release of China’s Africa 
policy paper, an unprecedented amount of high-level visits to Africa and the launch of 
the third CACF in Beijing. 2006 highlighted Africa’s increasing importance to China 
and that China was here to stay. Similarly, the increasing opportunities African states 
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see with Chinese engagement is highlighted in the number of African heads of states 
attending the last CACF, over 40 heads of state versus only 4 at the first summit. 
China’s pledge to double its aid to Africa by 2009, and make US$10 billion available 
for preferential loans, preferential buyers credit and to use for encouraging Chinese 
companies to invest in the continent, reflects China’s serious commitment to the 
continent. However, Africa only accounts for 2% of China’s international trade which 
makes Africa less important to China than China is to Africa.   
 
In terms of aid, China has always favoured providing for infrastructural projects 
which demonstrate its power as a rising world power and its knowledge that these 
projects also provide legitimacy for the ruling elite. We saw that the request to cancel 
Africa’s debt initially alarmed Chinese official, however China’s subsequent decision 
to cancel debt has reaped a number of rewards. These rewards include the everlasting 
support from African states at the international level in return for China having acted 
on one of Africa’s developmental needs. Aid has also come in the form of training 
programmes, educational initiatives, technical assistance, tariff exemption and 
peacekeeping activities. All forms of aid have been successful in helping China 
achieve its objectives in Africa, especially that of securing diplomatic relations. 
 
With a massive population and a booming economy continued access to natural 
resources is vital for Chinese national security which entails sustained economic 
growth and providing for its population. Increased trade between countries is always 
seen as a precursor to positive transformation in that country. Trade between China 
and Africa has quintupled since 2000. China’s biggest imports from Africa are oil, 
ores and metals, while its biggest exports to Africa are manufactured goods such as 
machinery and textiles. This has brought criticism from the West and within Africa 
itself that China’s approach to Africa is neo-colonialist. Investment on the continent, 
not surprisingly, also falls primarily in the energy and resource sectors and is usually 
aid related. China has placed a high priority on maintaining strong ties with African 
energy suppliers through investment, high-level visits, and its strict policy of non-
interference in internal affairs (which Africa’s dictators find comforting).  
 
This chapter also discovered that if China wants to avoid the increasing perception 
that its interests in Africa are self-serving, a number of challenges and obstacles will 
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have to be overcome. This includes diversification of Africa’s export markets, 
adopting mechanisms which encourage the better management of natural resources, 
becoming environmentally sensitive, and taking more responsibility when dealing 
with regimes that abuse human rights. It is implicit that with China’s rising global 
power status comes more responsibility to ensure good governance, democracy and 
development in its relations with other states. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Taiwan and the One-China Policy 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the Kuomintang (KMT) departed mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, the 
question of reunification of China has been haunting both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
From the Chinese point of view, Taiwan is a renegade province and therefore a 
domestic matter. Although it is no longer recognised as an “independent” state by the 
vast majority of states around the world, Taiwan, on the other hand, believes that it is 
a sovereign state and that it has the legal right to self-determination. Taiwan’s mission 
to gain international recognition and China’s resolve to stop it has come to force in 
Africa. Thus, the competition for diplomatic recognition between China and Taiwan 
has become an increasingly important issue in China’s Africa policy.  
 
This chapter will begin with a short history of China’s Taiwan policy, which can be 
divided into five basic periods: the military offensive, the diplomatic offensive, the 
peaceful offensive, the sudden crisis, and return to a slightly modified peaceful 
offensive. This is followed by the Taiwan issue and its role in Africa seen from the 
Taiwanese perspective. We ask why China even bothers competing with Taiwan. 
Lastly, we look at Taiwan’s response to China’s increasing presence in Africa and 
offer some suggestions. 
 
5.2. A Brief History 
 
It is important to look at the history of Chinese-Taiwanese relations as actions taken 
by China in response to Taiwan have evolved over the years and reflect directly on its 
Africa policy. Up until the late 1970s China’s stance on Taiwan was confrontational 
based on the notion of the reunification with Taiwan. Lee Lai To divides China’s 
policy at this time into two distinct strategies: the military offensive from 1950 to the 
early 1960s and the diplomatic offensive from the early 1960s through to the late 
1970s.  
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During the military offensive China tried to reunify the country three times. As early 
as 1950, China was planning an amphibious attack on Taiwan, this was however, 
disturbed by Taiwan’s preventative actions and the need to move northward many of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in the south because of the outbreak of 
the Korean War.244 However, President Truman had announced in 1950 that the US 
would use the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan. This announcement was 
later set in stone when the Mutual Security Treaty was signed in 1954, committing the 
US to come to Taiwan’s defence should it come under Chinese attack. US presence 
was instrumental in stopping a major China-Taiwan armed conflict. 
 
With the military option out of bounds, Beijing tried other measures to reunify China. 
This became known as the diplomatic offensive. These measures included propaganda 
broadcasts, infiltration agents, and mobilisation of support from overseas Chinese. 
China also started fighting for international recognition as the sole and legitimate 
government of China. However, soon after China became engulfed in the Cultural 
Revolution and was too concerned with its domestic chaos on the mainland to give 
attention to the Taiwan issue.245 Once China emerged from the turbulent conditions of 
the Cultural Revolution, it started a concerted campaign to gain support for 
international recognition. This campaign was most notable in Africa where at the time 
we see a marked increase in the aid China gave to African states. This is best shown 
through the example of the fight for the seat at the UN. Beijing’s diplomatic 
breakthrough to membership, and the expulsion of Taiwan at the UN in 1971, became 
China’s most impressive achievement in its contest for international recognition.246 In 
1972 the Shanghai Communiqué was signed between China and the USA. It stated 
that: 
 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The 
United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its 
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interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese 
themselves.247 
 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and US national security advisor, Henry 
Kissinger wrote the paragraph for the communiqué. This was an important step to 
finding a formula for both sides to agree to disagree and thus set the grounds for 
renewed US-Sino ties.248  “The Taiwan paragraph of the Communiqué,” Kissinger 
later wrote, “put the Taiwan issue in abeyance, with each side maintaining its basic 
principles.” 249  Besides the US’s acknowledgement of the “one China” stance 
regarding Taiwan, perhaps the most beneficial outcome from the Shanghai 
Communiqué was the cancellation of the US-Taiwan mutual defence treaty.250 This 
action lifted a grave threat and a big worry for China. Furthermore, in 1979 the US cut 
its official ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with China – an 
event which Taiwan believes led to many other countries breaking off official 
relations with Taiwan and recognising China.251  In 1970, Taiwan had diplomatic 
relations with 67 countries, while China had relations with 54. In 1971 the numbers 
were 56 and 74, respectively. By 1979, only 23 countries maintained diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, and 127 countries had official relations with China.252 It is 
important to take into consideration that the actions of the US, China and Taiwan are 
all interrelated and thus have an impact on Sino-Africa relations. For example, during 
this period China was concerned about the US’s growing global influence and feared 
that the US would prevent its rise as a superpower and also its efforts to reunify with 
Taiwan. Thus by gaining it UN seat China gained international recognition and allies 
to help counter the US threat. Shortly after the Shanghai Communiqué, China began 
to issue peaceful gestures and proposals for reunification. This shift coincided with 
Deng Xiaoping’s coming to power and, of course, the adoption of his economic 
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reform and open-door policies. This became known as the peaceful era and lasted 
until early 1995.  
 
In order for China’s economic policies to be successful, the development of a peaceful 
and stable external environment conducive to economic growth, including friendly 
relations with the major powers and its Asian neighbours, as well as Taiwan, was vital 
for China. 253  China believed that its open-door policy and the ensuing rapid 
development would increase Taiwan’s dependence on the Mainland and thus create a 
good reason for Taiwan to move to reunification. At this time, as already mentioned, 
peaceful reunification through negotiation was emphasised. To show its commitment 
China stopped shelling the off-shore islands, stopped all propaganda references to the 
liberation of Taiwan, appealed for discussions to end military confrontation, and 
suggested a variety of cross-strait links.254 It was during this era that Deng publicly 
formulated the “one country, two systems” concept. Under this system China is the 
sole legal government of China and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.255 Deng 
had also reflected a desire for a speedy resolution to the Taiwan crisis. In September 
1994 China made a statement indicating that it would use all economic and diplomatic 
resources to reward countries that were willing to isolate Taiwan and punish “hostile 
foreign forces” that encouraged Taiwan’s independence. 256  Furthermore, China 
claimed that it would focus its limited resources and foreign aid on “dangerous areas”, 
which included countries that might develop strong ties with Taiwan, or whose 
economic relations with Taiwan might change into political relations.257 
 
The peaceful era and the policies set out by Deng continued into Jiang Zemin’s rule. 
However, in 1995, minor adjustments were made to China’s Taiwan policy and the 
Jiang Eight Points were formulated. Although based on the core principles laid out by 
Deng, Jiang’s Eight Points focused primarily on the possibilities of cross-strait 
discussions leading to reunification. Where Deng’s approach had been a desire to 
resolve the Taiwan issue during the 1980s, Jiang’s approach did not anticipate such a 
hasty reunification, instead, it sought only agreement on a transitional framework that 
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would stabilise the status quo, facilitate economic exchanges, and generally pre-empt 
any permanent separation of Taiwan from the Mainland.258 In response to Jiang’s 
proposal Taiwan issued a counter-proposal for talks, stating that before any 
negotiations could begin, China must renounce any threat of force against Taiwan. 
From the Chinese perspective this was an unacceptable demand and viewed by most 
Chinese leaders as an outright rejection. 
 
However, a series of events that started in May 1995 soon obscured the conciliatory 
policy of Jiang’s Eight Points. Three key events provoked China and led to what 
became known as the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Firstly, a US$6 billion sale of F-16 fighter 
planes to Taiwan from the US (which was a response to China’s acquisition of 
Russian SU-27s). Secondly, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui began a campaign to 
get Taiwan re-elected into the UN. Lee was offering to pay US$ 1 billion to get a UN 
seat. Thirdly, the US withdrew an earlier ban and allowed Lee to visit the US and 
make a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University, this trip was used by Lee to 
polish Taiwan’s independent image.259 In Taiwan’s view, independence was the only 
way to break its international isolation, and joining the UN would effectively 
demonstrate that independence.260 These developments hastened China to develop a 
hard-line strategy.  
 
Beginning in early 1996, the PLA mobilised its forces opposite Taiwan and on 5 
March 1996, China announced that it had plans for missile tests and live-fire air and 
naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Incidentally, this coincided with the election run-
up for Taiwan’s first and fully free democratic elections. Three days after China made 
its announcement it fired missiles into the Taiwan Strait close to Taiwan’s two largest 
ports and disturbed its shipping. Tensions escalated when China repeated their refusal 
to renounce the use of force to settle the Taiwan question. In response the US 
dispatched two aircraft carriers and their battle groups to the Taiwan Strait.261. Of 
course, China was enraged with the US’s interference in its internal affairs, but for the 
most part, China had to accept that its threats had been neutralised.  America had sent 
a clear message to China: it would not stand by idly as China used military force 
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against Taiwan. China had lost ground diplomatically, but it did send a very clear 
message that it would respond if Taiwan made moves that displeased it.  
 
After the sudden crisis, the Jiang Eight Points became part of a larger strategy China 
designed to constrain Taiwan’s freedom of action internationally and deter the US 
from intervening militarily in the event of a future Taiwan-China confrontation.262 
Soon after China had fired its missiles into the Taiwanese Strait, Jiang left for his 
Africa tour. Jiang’s policy was reinforced when all six countries he visited made clear 
that they supported China’s stand on its reunification and vowed not to have any 
official relations with Taiwan in any form.263 It was at this time that China became 
particularly aggressive in up-holding the “one-China, two systems” policy.  
 
Throughout his reign Hu Jintao has continued to encourage a peaceful resolution to 
the Taiwan issue. In March 2005 Hu stated that China promises to resolve the issue 
through peaceful means, which was also stated in the Anti-Secession Law passed by 
the National People’s Congress immediately after. However, China has also warned 
that it will use “non-peaceful means” if Taiwan legally breaks away from China. 
Moreover, if a war across the Taiwan Strait should arise, China has even threatened to 
use nuclear weapons against the US if the American military tries to intervene.264   
 
5.3. Taiwan: A Taiwanese Point of View 
 
Taiwan believes that international recognition will legitimise its regime, thus making 
it less likely that China will use military force to unite Taiwan with China. Therefore 
Taiwan has used foreign economic assistance as a very successful method to achieve 
its foreign policy objectives. This has been particularly successful amongst the 
smaller African states. This section will look at Taiwan’s efforts for diplomatic 
recognition amongst African states. 
 
Gaining worldwide recognition is an important factor in attaining international 
legitimacy and has thus become the most important foreign policy objective for 
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Taiwan. Therefore, recognition from African states will help Taiwan break from 
China’s diplomatic grip which recognises Taiwan as an economic body but not a 
political body. Taiwan for the last two decades has been an economically powerful 
state. With a per capita income of US$29 000 in 2006265, compared to China’s per 
capita income of US$7 600266, Taiwan clearly has the upper hand when it comes to 
economic matters. Taiwan has used its economic strength to deepen its relations with 
friendly countries and widen its network, or as Taylor points out “Taipei’s ‘dollar 
diplomacy’ has been relatively successful in aiding Taiwan to raise its international 
profile.”267 Dollar diplomacy refers to a state’s efforts to secure its objectives through 
financial and economic instruments of control.268 Taiwan has vast foreign exchange 
reserves which it is able to use in its international relations. Of course, at times these 
reserves have helped to persuade some African states to switch recognition from 
China to Taiwan.269  
 
Philip Liu suggests that cross strait competition for legitimacy does not happen within 
states of important strategic interest to China, such as Muslim Africa where those 
states would more than likely decline Taipei’s attempt to exchange aid for political 
recognition. However, the main area where Taiwan does focus is the low-income 
states in Africa, where Sino-African cooperation is low, the governments are unstable 
and the aid needs are high.270 Or as Segal points out “it’s a sign of the poverty in 
Africa and lack of principle in international relations with poor African states that can 
be bought by the higher Taiwanese offers of aid.”271 In addition, the provision of aid 
incentives to poor states with minimal trade relations with Taiwan can also easily 
sway a decision. For example a country like Swaziland, which has no substantial trade 
relations with China has nothing to lose if it sides with Taiwan in the “one-China” 
dispute, whereas South Africa on the other hand had almost US$2 billion trade deals 
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with China when it switched recognition from Taiwan. Thus it would have been 
impractical for South Africa to jeopardise that kind of economic advantage. 272  
African states have been successful in playing China against Taiwan to maximise the 
foreign aid they can get from each country. For example, Guinea Bissau and the 
Central African Republic (CAR) switched diplomatic recognition to China because 
Taiwan had rejected a loan request for US$ 90 million and US$120 million 
respectively. In 1997 China had extended a US$ 14 million loan to Sao Tome and 
Principe but four months later switched recognition because of a US$30 million loan 
from Taiwan.273 Therefore, if Taiwan or China cannot satisfy their allies demands for 
aid, their allies can reverse recognition at any time (refer to Taiwan’s current allies in 
able 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Taiwan’s Allies in Africa and Year of Recognition
Country 
Diplomatic Diplomatic 
hina 
Country 
Diplomatic 
iwan 
Diplomatic 
hina 
T
 
274 
Year 
Relations 
Established 
Year 
Relations 
Established 
with Taiwan 
Year 
Relations 
Established 
with C with Ta
Year 
Relations 
Established 
with C
Burkina 
Faso 
1961, 1994 1973 Tome 1997 1975 Sao 
and 
Principe 
Gambia 1968, 1995 974 waziland 968 1 S 1  
Malawi 1966     
 
As from January 2007 only 24 states recognise Taiwan and about one fifth of those 
are from Africa. From Africa’s 53 countries, only five maintain official diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. They are Burkina Faso, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome and 
Principe, and Swaziland. In 2003 Liberia switched relations to China after China 
promised to provide it with loans and resource assistance. 275  In 2005 Senegal 
switched relations and stated that the decision was made on “results from an objective 
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and deep analysis of the global geopolitical situation”.276 After Senegal’s decision to 
swap recognition and in an effort to save its remaining diplomatic ties, Taiwan’s 
foreign minister set off on a six-nation Africa tour. The small African states managed 
to squeeze aid from the desperate Taiwan and Malawi managed to gain an agreement 
for the construction of a road in the isolated north-east of the country.277 In August 
2006 Chad was the most recent country to switch recognition. It was a move that 
greatly embarrassed Taipei and forced the island’s premier to cancel a visit to that 
country at the last minute.278    
 
During the 1990s competition between China and Taiwan to win diplomatic 
recognition from African countries escalated drastically. While Taiwan used aid and 
trade as an inducement. China relied heavily on its rising status as a global power and 
its great potential as a trading partner and in addition offered large amounts of 
economic assistance with the promise of its new allies to adhere to the one-China 
policy. As a result, China was able to secure recognition from six of Taiwan’s former 
allies. Lesotho and Niger switched recognition to China in 1994 and 1996 
respectively. The CAR, Guinea Bissau and South Africa all switched in 1998, and 
Liberia switched in 2003 just before China deployed 558 peacekeepers to Liberia and 
sent PLA troops to assist with Liberian water-supply projects.279 
 
Under President Lee Teng-hui Taiwan began a policy of “pragmatic diplomacy”. 
Under this policy Taiwan aimed to broaden its international space by strengthening 
non-political relations with other countries and by attempting to participate in as many 
international organisations as possible. 280  This would legitimise Taiwan in world 
politics and by implication this recognition would mean that the world would 
recognise Taiwan as a separate entity from China, which in turn would make it more 
difficult for China to utilise force to unite Taiwan, thus diluting China’s claim that 
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Taiwan is a domestic issue.281 From Taiwan’s point of view, similar to that of China’s, 
each country carries one vote at the UN, even the smallest country such as Swaziland 
is important to Taiwan because of its international standing. 282  Taiwan was 
particularly active throughout the 1990s, using several of its allies to petition the 
General Assembly to consider dual representation for China and Taiwan. From 2000 
the request for dual recognition was dropped and the focus shifted to the “exceptional 
international situation pertaining to the Republic of China on Taiwan.”283 Overall, 
Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy has been fairly successful. By the end of Lee’s period 
in office, Taiwan had increased its number of diplomatic allies from 22 to 28, and had 
expanded its membership in inter-governmental organisations from twelve to sixteen. 
Under Taiwan’s present president, Chen Shui-bian, the number of inter-governmental 
organisations Taiwan belongs to has increased to 26, including the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia 
Development Bank (ADB) and observer status at the World Health Organisation 
(WHO).284   
 
However, it would appear that China has aggressively intensified its diplomatic tug-
of-war with Taiwan over the last several years. In its first African policy document, 
Beijing said that the one China policy remains “the political foundation for the 
establishment and development” of relations with African countries. “The Chinese 
government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries 
abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with 
Taiwain and support China’s great cause of reunification”.285 Furthermore, in order to 
show the “comprehensiveness” of China’s cooperation with Africa, China decided to 
invite the five Taiwanese allies to the 2006 CACF. As a result, private sector 
representatives from Burkina Faso, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe and 
Swaziland attended the forum, which clearly unsettled the Taiwanese.286 In March 
2007 Taiwanese Foreign Minister James Huang stated “the rise of China has indeed 
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posed a great threat to us”.287 China has used its economic clout to “lure away allies” 
and “expand its influence [in Africa]”.288 Since President Chen took office in 2000 
three African states have decided to switch recognition, they are Chad, Senegal and 
Liberia.  
 
Overall though, it would appear that the chances of China using force to reunify 
China and Taiwan are very slim. The primary reason would have to be that a war with 
Taiwan would disrupt China’s economy and scarce resources used in its more 
pressing nation-building would have to be diverted. 289  Secondly, three quarters of 
China’s trade is carried out with the Asia-Pacific region, therefore the continued 
support and cooperation of the countries in that region is needed for China’s 
continued economic growth. Of course, this region includes Taiwan, which has 
perhaps the largest source of foreign investment in China.290 Thus it would appear 
that China would prefer use its economic strength and squeeze Taiwan by way of 
diplomatic pressure and wining over its last few remaining.  
 
5.4. Why does China bother?  
 
One may ask why China even bothers to compete with Taiwan when only five of 
some of the smallest and poorest states in Africa have diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan in the first place? There are basically four reasons. Taylor suggests two 
primary reasons: first, not solving the Taiwan issue would be an awful loss of face for 
China, and second, China has branded itself as a representative of the developing 
world.291 When looking at the first reason, we can understand that if Taiwan did in 
fact become an independent state, this would raise questions about the Communists 
Party’s hold over its people and aggravate internal problems with separatist 
movements and thus weaken China’s international status. This could set a precedent 
for particularly rebellious parts of China, such as Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner 
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Mongolia.292 Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang have begun to reassert demands 
for greater autonomy. In 1997, Muslims clashed with police officers, smashed 
storefronts, and attacked ethnic Han Chinese, and terrorist bombed three public buses, 
killing five people and wounding over 60. These developments reinforce China’s 
determination to prevent Taiwan from gaining international recognition. 293  When 
looking at the second reason, as self-appointed representative of the developing world, 
it is important for China to uphold this image, especially in Africa where those states 
add political and numerical support to its claims.  A third reason, is that for every state 
China manages to persuade to come to its side, is one state less that recognises 
Taiwan. If this trend continues Taiwan’s campaign for international competition may 
just fizzle out and in the end, the Taiwan issue could just be a “domestic matter”. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Taiwan has a trade surplus of US$7 billion with 
the US, including many high-tech industries and a well educated and entrepreneurial 
population, if China does get control of Taiwan it will add the world’s thirty-third 
biggest economy294 and perhaps the largest source of foreign investment to its already 
booming existent economy.295 
 
Thus far, it would appear that China’s engagement in Africa is inseparable from its 
efforts to displace Taiwan’s official relations with Africa. This is of course true, 
however, whereas in the past China would punish those states which recognised 
Taiwan by cutting diplomatic links and withdrawing all foreign assistance and other 
projects, China presently has a far more flexible approach. Now there is the selective 
involvement of businesses and Chinese provincial representatives which remain in 
country and work to emphasise the mix of pragmatism and necessity that characterises 
China’s new Africa policy. A prime example of where China disregarded the one-
China policy was in oil-rich Chad when it still recognised Taiwan (Chad only 
switched recognition in August 2006). In 2004, Chad was China’s tenth biggest 
trading partner in Africa.296 In 2003 a new pipeline running from Chad to Cameroon 
was opened so that oil from Chad can be transported directly to a major port.  
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 Therefore, as China’s economy grows and other incentives to win recognition from 
the remaining countries that recognise Taiwan are likely to increase and be more 
effective. It would appear that China is systematically advancing and fine-tuning its 
one-China policy and inhibiting Taiwan’s efforts to expand diplomatic recognition. 
China’s efforts will more than likely accelerate in the future. 
 
5.5. Some suggestions for Taiwan 
 
It is clear that with its growing clout and leverage in Africa, China is hoping to win 
over Taiwan’s five remaining allies in Africa. Many observers say that Taiwan’s 
ability to hold onto these allies is a losing battle, the business and investment 
opportunities which China can now offer on a massive scale cannot compete with the 
US$900 million annual budget allocated to the Taiwanese foreign ministry. 297  
However, in order to counter the Chinese threat in Africa, Taiwan should work to 
consolidate diplomatic ties with its African allies by helping developing their 
economies. 298 Taiwan should put more emphasis on improving the business 
environments in the countries it aids to in order to lure Taiwanese companies to invest 
there. In order to better encourage investment in Africa and consolidate its diplomatic 
relations, the government should help build the local infrastructure to facilitate trade 
(this has been a very successful measure used by China). An attempt should be made 
to identify niche markets and then to help develop them. Furthermore, Bill Cho from 
the Taiwanese department of economic and trade affairs suggests that Taipei should 
negotiate with insurance companies to insure Taiwanese properties in Africa in the 
event of war or riots.299   
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
It is hoped that this chapter illustrated how aid from China and Taiwan has helped to 
gain support from African states. The Taiwan issue has generated much controversy 
due primarily to the fact that both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments have 
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completely different views on the fate of Taiwan. As previously mentioned, China 
views Taiwan as a renegade province and thus a domestic affair, whereas Taiwan 
believes it has the right to self-determination and is thus seeking international 
legitimacy.  
 
The significance of the African states and the role they play in the China-Taiwan issue 
did not become important until 1970, the year before China was admitted into the UN. 
In the preceding years any attempt by China to reunify with Taiwan was blocked by 
the US, who had promised to militarily intervene if China used force. The fact that the 
US was willing to use force in what China saw as a purely “domestic” matter, 
threatened China enormously. The year before China was elected onto the UN 
Security Council, its aid agreements and the number of aid recipients increased 
dramatically, especially amongst the African states. The number of countries which 
recognised China after entering the UN rose dramatically, even more so in 1979 when 
the US changed recognition. The fact that the US recognised China eased its 
perceived threat and thus began a peaceful period where China could pay more 
attention on developing its economy in a peaceful environment.  
 
However, once Taiwan began to actively campaign for dual recognition at the UN and 
the right to independence, China became anxious and tensions rose, escalating in the 
Taiwan-Strait Crisis. The US intervened, the fact that the worlds most powerful state 
was interfering in China’s affairs once again, threatened China. China believed 
something had to be done about this uncontested hegemon. Soon after the crisis, Jiang 
Zemin set off on his Africa tour in order to deepen its relations and consolidate ties 
with the African states. On his tour Zemin expressively stated that China would not 
have any diplomatic relations with any country that recognised Taiwan.   
 
One may wonder why China even bothers competing with Taiwan. There are a 
number of reasons. Economically, if reunification was successful China would be 
gaining one of the world’s biggest developed economies. Politically, in terms of 
following through on its role as representative of the Third World, the more states that 
recognise China, the greater credibility China has in taking on that role. China would 
also be saving face should the question of the Communist Party’s control over its 
people be questioned.  
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 In conclusion, Taiwan is able to concentrate its greater financial resources on the 
small number of countries that recognise it, while strategically approaching other 
countries that might consider switching recognition to them. China, who has fewer 
resources and more countries to support, must carefully consider its investments in 
countries that are likely to provide a stable return. However, it’s only the smallest and 
poorest states in Africa which are willing to develop diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
Therefore when looking at China’s Africa Policy, the China-Taiwan issue should not 
be overstressed because in the end only five out of 53 African countries recognise 
Taiwan.  
 
Despite the success of Taiwan’s pragmatic foreign policy, especially in getting 
Taiwan elected onto various international organisations, Taiwan is struggling to keep 
its number of African allies up. Liberia, Senegal and Chad switched sides in 2003, 
2005 and 2006 respectively, in order to keep up the changing international 
geopolitical situation. If Taiwan were able to secure further allies in Africa, it would 
be unlikely that Taiwan could uphold the increasing economic assistance that African 
states demand in order to keep allegiance. Economic aid for diplomatic recognition is 
an expensive business that cannot continue indefinitely. Furthermore, with China’s 
recent laxing of its one-China policy and its economic forays should be cause for 
concern for Taiwan. China’s economic venture into Chad was the foothold China 
needed to get Chad to switch recognition.  
 
It would therefore appear the race for recognition is no longer as important as it was 
in the past because in recent years China has been more successful than Taiwan in its 
attempts to convince African countries to shift recognition and in certain cases China 
may disregard the one-China policy if the conditions are right, especially where 
access to natural resources is concerned. However, if Taiwan were to step up and help 
the countries it aids to develop their own economies, through creating favourable 
investment environments, encouraging infrastructure development and encourage 
favourable insurance policies for Taiwanese businesses in Africa, this could help 
consolidate diplomatic relations with Africa and thus create fewer reasons for their 
allies to want to switch recognition to China.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper set out to explore the premise “Chinese aid to Africa: A foreign policy tool 
for political support”. Quite clearly, perhaps even quite obviously, we can state that 
Chinese aid to Africa has indeed been used as a foreign policy tool to gain support.  
What makes this interesting is the way in which China’s focus has changed over the 
years. China’s engagement with Africa has shifted radically since the end of the Cold 
War. From the Bandung Conference in 1955 until the end of the 1980s, China’s 
policy in Africa focused on support for independence and Pan-African movements 
and the dissemination of its communist ideologies. In the post-Tiananmen era China’s 
interaction with Africa took on a new focus, that of enhancing its economic self 
interests and integrating itself with the international community. It also devoted a 
significant amount of energy to counter Taiwan’s diplomatic inroads onto the 
continent. Presently, China’s primary objective in Africa is to ensure that it remains a 
secure source for oil and raw materials, a growing market for Chinese exports and a 
base for support for China’s expanding global interests. During each period, China’s 
objectives would not have been successfully achieved had it not been for its aid 
policies.  
 
The realist paradigm was used to help understand the dynamics of foreign policy 
making and thus the evolution of China’s aid policies in Africa. Realists believe the 
world is anarchic, threats, dangers and insecurities to the state appear large and thus 
relations between states are viewed as a struggle for power. China believes that power 
will grant it the capacity to safeguard its national interest. Power is exercised in 
relation to another entity and calculations are made about ones own power as well as 
the power other state actors possess. From the very beginning China has been 
particularly successful in exercising its power, not through the traditional military 
means, but rather through diplomatic influence. Furthermore, the primary goal of the 
state is survival and its central activity is the pursuit and exercise of power in order to 
preserve itself and its political identity. In other words, national interest guides state 
policy in relation to its external environment. China prioritized its national interests 
above all else, even above human rights.  
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Foreign aid as a foreign policy tool was shown to be an instrument of policy used in 
order to achieve certain goals. On the one hand aid is used to assist developing 
countries in mobilizing their economies for sustained economic growth and political 
stability, but from the realist perspective, aid signifies the transfer of money from one 
government to another for political services rendered or to be rendered. From China’s 
earliest engagement with Africa, China was successful in eliciting diplomatic support 
from African states, particularly concerning issues brought forward at the UN. 
 
During the Cold War China’s aid policies benefited China politically and like the 
tribute missions of the past were meant to illustrate the advanced nature of Chinese 
culture. Its aid policies sought to achieve three strategic goals. As a newly 
independent state, China realised that gaining international recognition was essential 
for its own survival. Anti-imperialism was encouraged and a united front of African 
and Asian states was encouraged in order to facilitate the common efforts to end 
economic and cultural backwardness. Africa’s importance to China was manifested in 
Chou En-lai’s African tour where China also explicitly set out its principles of foreign 
aid. Equality and mutual benefit and respect for the sovereignty of the recipient 
countries were amongst the most important elements mentioned and were also set to 
become permanent fixtures in China’s aid policies. During the Cultural Revolution aid 
was dramatically decreased and only handed out to radical countries which openly 
praised the aims of the Cultural Revolution.  
 
In order to ensure security within China and the continued authority of the 
Communist Party within the state, Chinese aid was used to gain support for Mao’s 
regime and also to counter Soviet influence in Africa. China accused the Soviet Union 
of imperialist tendencies and soon afterwards both countries were handing out aid in 
order to gain support. China’s aid increased dramatically. In the early 1970s the Tan-
Zam railway was built. The largest Chinese aid project in Africa, it was successful in 
gaining political advantage, rather than providing for economic upliftment on the 
continent. The project won friends amongst all African states opposed to white 
supremacist rule, China’s technological capabilities were highlighted and bolstered 
Mao Tse Tung’s bid for the leadership of the Third World. However, when China was 
admitted to the UN in 1971, it was by no doubt facilitated by the significant aid 
disbursements handed out in Africa in the preceding year. One third of the votes for 
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China came from Africa. China’s entrance into the UN signified recognition as a 
world power and support from the international community to balance the Soviet 
threat. Up until this point China’s aid policies have helped to ensure diplomatic 
support from African states, most significantly in gaining recognition at the UN.  
 
In the post-Cold War era, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China is no longer 
concerned about gaining support for political ideologies but rather it is set on looking 
out for its national interests, especially economic interests. In the pre-Tiananmen era 
we notice that African states have been marginalised by China, aid has decreased 
dramatically and China prefers to focus on countries which compliment its growing 
economic needs, that is the West. However, once the Tiananmen crisis occurs and 
China is shunned by the West, China turns on the charm offensive and once more aid 
is offered in order to encourage support for China from African states. Subsequently, 
any mention of China’s human rights abuses are blocked at the UN over the following 
few years. Under Jiang Zemin, China’s relations with Africa focus on China’s 
economic self interest and as a result methods to improve Sino-Africa relations 
become the cornerstone of China’s Africa policy. In terms of aid, project construction 
is replaced with bilateral contracted projects which emphasise maximum profit and 
aid recipients are diversified. With the release of the 1998 White Paper, China’s need 
for a steady and reliable source of oil is confirmed in order to help sustain China’s 
rapid-growing economy. Up until this point we notice how China’s policies have 
shifted to focus on relations and projects that will ensure the maximum economic gain 
for China. 
 
In 1980 China’s share of world trade was less than 1%, by 2003 it had risen to 6%, 
China’s economy is booming and in order to continue expanding its economy and 
catering to its 1.4 billion citizens, China needs to acquire and secure access to sources 
of raw materials. The year 2000 marked the beginning of a dramatic shift in China’s 
engagement in Africa, particularly the development of relations with resource-rich 
states. The China-African Cooperation Forum was established to consolidate relations 
between the two regions. The CACF is held every three years and by the 2006 CACF, 
nearly every African head of state attends the meeting which makes it the largest 
diplomatic meeting in the history of China. No other major has shown the same level 
of interest in Africa. The CACF, among other things, facilitated trade and investment 
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agreements between China and Africa, cancelled US$1.27 billion of debt and 
encouraged infrastructural development in a number of African countries.   
 
China’s economic engagement with the continent is advanced by technical aid and 
debt forgiveness for building influence on the continent. Financial assistance from 
China funds infrastructure projects; debt forgiveness earns China considerable 
political capital among African states and ensures s African support at the UN and 
other multilateral forums.; training programmes and training initiatives enhances 
understanding on both sides; technical assistance ensures Chinese influence in the 
region; and peacekeeping initiatives in Africa raise China’s international profile. 
Furthermore, China’s aid programme to Africa has proven to better over time, than 
the West’s, in addressing African concerns about their expensive transport costs and 
crumbling infrastructure. China has built bridges, railways, highways and 
hydroelectric plants, whereas the West turned from infrastructure many years ago. 
China listened to what Africans wanted. Up until this point we can understand that 
China’s intense engagement with Africa, its dramatic increase in trade and investment 
relations did not just happen over night. The flurry of activity we see today has deep 
roots, roots that have been nurtured by aid programmes since the 1950s and which 
was significantly helped along by the creation of the CACF and China’s Africa Policy. 
China has always been successful in reading what Africa needs, China’s insistence on 
Third World solidarity has served it well, as has its policy of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of another state.  
 
High-level visits by Chinese officials always result in the signing of trade agreements 
and the granting of aid disbursements from China. 
 
China believes that Taiwan is a renegade province, whereas Taiwan believes that it is 
a sovereign state and that it has the legal right to self determination. Taiwan’s mission 
to gain international recognition and China’s resolve to stop it has come to force in 
Africa. China devoted considerable energy to this during the 1990s, however 
presently China’s energy is less intense. Although only five countries in Africa still 
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, China maintains that it will not have any 
diplomatic relations with any country that recognises Taiwan, usually the smallest and 
poorest states – the states which are not rich in natural resources and have nothing to 
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lose by maintaining relations to Taiwan. Aid is used by both China and Taiwan to win 
over allies. However, China’s economic deals with Taiwan’s allies seem to be the 
foothold China needs to get them to change recognition, as is the case with Chad. It is 
thought that if Taiwan can manage to consolidate its diplomatic ties and help develop 
the economies of its remaining allies it is less likely that they will want to switch 
recognition.  
 
Prospects 
 
It is clear that China’s engagement with Africa has shifted over the years, as has its 
aid policies on the continent. Let us look at some of the prospects which lay ahead for 
the China- Africa alliance: 
 
• It is no secret that China’s demand for natural resources has led to rising 
commodity prices, which has helped African economies grow. This trend 
has been forecast to be around for at least the next fifteen years. However 
this boom has not enriched Africa’s people, rather it has enriched Africa’s 
elite who are plagued by corruption. Corruption impacts heavily on 
development, or rather, lack there of.  
• The inevitable friction and conflicts that are part and parcel of all serious 
relations will emerge with greater Chinese engagement in Africa. African 
governments need to be clear on what they need or want from China. 
• Aid needs to be offered in a manner that strengthens African institutions, 
encourages transparency, improves macroeconomic policies, develops 
national and regional infrastructure, assists technical capacity-building, 
and facilitates the growth of Africa’s productive sector. In other words, for 
both China and Africa to benefit, aid-giving must be aligned to African 
needs, that is promoting growth and enhancing continental productive 
capacity.300 
 
 
 
                                                 
300 Mollo, J., et al, “Competition or Partnership? China, United States and Africa – An African View” 
Brenthurst Discussion Papers 2/2007, The Brenthurst Foundation, February 2007, p.5 
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 Appendix A 
 
China's African Policy301 
January 2006 
Foreword  
The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and 
profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. 
Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, 
promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which are the common desire of 
all peoples, represent the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing 
factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues 
of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more 
pressing.  
China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful 
development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready 
to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and 
common prosperity around the world.  
The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing 
countries, is an important force for world peace and development. China-Africa 
traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. 
With this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the 
world the objectives of China's policy toward Africa and the measures to achieve 
them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a 
view of promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and 
bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.  
Part I: Africa's Position and Role  
Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge 
potential for development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed 
themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and 
emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.  
Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously 
exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, 
stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African 
countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the 
political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being 
gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The New Partnership for 
Africa's Development (NEPAD) has drawn up an encouraging picture of African 
rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the 
South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing 
an increasingly important role in international affairs.  
                                                 
301 This is the official Africa policy document published by the Chinese government on 12 January 
2006, found on the People’s Daily website 
http://english.people.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html# 
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Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the 
persistent efforts of African countries and the continuous support of the international 
community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the 
new century.  
Part II: China's Relations with Africa  
China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing 
similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and 
supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound 
friendship.  
The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African 
countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the 
two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchanges of high-level visits 
and people-to-people contacts. Bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown 
rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and 
coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided 
assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have 
also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.  
Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development - these are 
the principles guiding China-Africa exchanges and cooperation and the driving force 
to lasting China-Africa relations.  
Part III: China's African Policy  
Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an 
important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will 
unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship. Proceeding from 
the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, China will 
establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa which features 
political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural 
exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's African policy are as 
follows:  
-- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of 
development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.  
-- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African 
countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building, carries out 
cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes 
common prosperity of China and Africa.  
-- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with 
Africa in the United Nations and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's 
just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international 
community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in 
Africa.  
-- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will 
learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, 
strengthen exchanges and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. 
Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work 
together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.  
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The one-China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and 
development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. 
The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
African countries abide by the one-China principle, refuse to have official relations 
and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China 
stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have 
not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one-China principle.  
Part IV: Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa  
1. The political field  
(1) High-level visits  
China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese 
and African leaders, with a view of facilitating communication, deepening friendship 
and promoting mutual understanding and trust.  
(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies  
China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis 
of mutual respect between China's National People's Congress (NPC) and parliaments 
of African countries and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU, for the purpose of 
deepening understanding and cooperation.  
(3) Exchanges between political parties  
The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with 
friendly political parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the 
principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding 
and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.  
(4) Consultation mechanisms  
Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African 
countries, political consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees 
on trade and economic cooperation and mixed committees on science and technology 
should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize dialogue and consultation 
in a flexible and pragmatic manner.  
(5) Cooperation in international affairs  
China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries in 
the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on 
major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues 
concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. 
China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. 
China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the United Nations play a greater 
role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new 
international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and 
mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law 
in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of 
developing countries.  
(6) Exchanges between local governments  
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China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local 
governments of China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state 
and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in 
local development and administration.  
2. The economic field  
(1) Trade  
The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African 
commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free 
treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries, with a view of 
expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It intends to 
settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly 
consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made 
to encourage business communities on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, China is willing to 
negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional 
organizations.  
(2) Investment  
The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment 
and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer 
credits to this end. The Chinese Government is ready to explore new channels and 
new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, and will 
continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and 
offer convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The 
Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the 
Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement 
on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides should work 
together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect 
the legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.  
(3) Financial cooperation  
To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese 
Government will support the effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase 
exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in African countries as well as 
regional financial institutions in Africa.  
(4) Agricultural cooperation  
China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with 
African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. 
Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, 
breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of 
agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural 
technology, organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out 
experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed 
up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program.  
(5) Infrastructure  
The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, 
telecommunications, water conservancy, electricity and other types of infrastructure. 
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It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of 
infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish 
multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to 
strengthen technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-
building of African nations.  
(6) Resources cooperation  
The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa 
in resources areas. It encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to 
cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual 
benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, 
with a view of helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to 
competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and 
the continent as a whole.  
(7) Tourism cooperation  
China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African 
nations and, grant more African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, 
Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese tourist groups. China welcomes 
citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.  
(8) Debt reduction and relief  
China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries to seek 
solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international 
community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the 
issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.  
(9) Economic assistance  
In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to 
provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings 
attached.  
(10) Multilateral cooperation  
China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within 
multilateral trade systems and financial institutions and work together to urge the 
United Nations and other international organizations to pay more attention to the 
question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward 
the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices 
of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. 
It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organizations to 
support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in 
Africa.  
3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects  
(1) Cooperation in human resources development and education  
The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human 
Resources Development Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify 
priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and provide more input according to the 
needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.  
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Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the 
number of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help 
African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance 
project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation 
in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging 
exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both 
sides.  
(2) Science and technology cooperation  
Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, 
China will promote its cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, 
technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and technological 
cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy 
utilization, geological survey, mining and the R&D of new medicines. It will continue 
its training programs in applied technologies for African countries, carry out 
demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and 
utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies 
applicable in Africa.  
(3) Cultural exchanges  
China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation 
plans reached with African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural 
departments and increase exchanges of artists and athletes. It will guide and promote 
cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations and institutions in 
line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.  
(4) Medical and health cooperation  
China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchanges with Africa. 
It will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to 
African countries, and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train 
medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and cooperation with African 
countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS 
and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and 
experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies.  
(5) Media cooperation  
China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchanges and cooperation 
between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable 
objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the 
communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the 
purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both 
domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.  
(6) Administrative cooperation  
China will carry out exchanges and cooperation with African countries in civil service 
system building, public administration reform and training of government personnel. 
The two sides may study the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for personnel and 
administrative cooperation.  
(7) Consular cooperation  
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China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during 
which the two sides may have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions 
of common interest in bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve 
understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work with Africa to 
facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.  
(8) People-to-people exchanges  
China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of 
China and Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view of increasing the 
understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and 
guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.  
(9) Environmental cooperation  
China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water 
resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of 
environmental protection by facilitating technological exchanges.  
(10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance  
China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological 
cooperation in the fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to 
African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid, encourage and support 
exchanges and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other NGOs 
on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.  
4. Peace and security  
(1) Military cooperation  
China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively 
carry out military-related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to 
help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of 
African countries for their own security.  
(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations  
China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional 
organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will 
provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to 
pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its 
support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.  
(3) Judicial and police cooperation  
China is prepared to promote the exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and 
African judicial and law enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from 
each other in legal system building and judicial reform so as to be better able to 
prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together with African 
countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify 
cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of 
criminal suspects.  
China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in 
tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control 
information and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and 
information exchange.  
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(4) Non-traditional security areas  
In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, 
it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and 
means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug 
trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.  
Part V: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation And Its Follow-up Actions  
Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective 
mechanism for the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China 
and Africa and put in place an important framework and platform for a new type of 
China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.  
China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation in strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation 
between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with African countries to 
conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social 
Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan 
(2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans. China will work with African countries 
within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political 
trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further 
improve the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering 
cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.  
Part VI: China's Relations with African Regional Organizations  
China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in 
the region and promoting African solidarity and development. China values its 
friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional 
and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance to the best of 
its capacity.  
China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations 
in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in their own 
regions and stands ready to enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations. 
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